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Invisible Taxpayers
LINDA SUGIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
“Only the little people pay taxes.”1  So said Leona Helmsley to her
maid.  That maid is one of millions of other little people who are
largely anonymous in the legal regime that regulates taxation.  They
pay their bills without taking advantage of avoidance schemes, tax
planning, or discretionary administrative largesse.  They are legally in-
visible, even while they are economically indispensable.  The para-
digm tax dispute involves a taxpayer on one side and the government
on the other, what this Article calls the “traditional dyad.”  In adjudi-
cating disputes, only the taxpayer in that dyad matters—even though
the interrelatedness of taxpayers across the fiscal system means that
one dyadic outcome often affects the interests of many other taxpay-
ers who are not part of it.  Everyone outside the dyad is invisible to
the legal system; they are faceless taxpayers without enforceable
rights in the administrative or judicial structure.  These taxpayers pay
the public’s bills, but they lack standing to challenge the unconstitu-
tionality of laws, regulations, or tax administration—except when they
are fighting over their own tax returns.2  Nor do they have any institu-
tion charged with protecting their interests.  Taxpayer invisibility pro-
duces injustice for individuals and undermines the rule of law.
Courts have made taxpayers invisible by adopting a narrow under-
standing of injury in standing doctrine that shuts taxpayers out of
court,3 and by characterizing revenue-reducing provisions in the tax
law as Congress abstaining from legislation.4  Congress has made tax-
* Professor of Law, Fordham Law School.  I am grateful to Mary Louise Fellows, Lily
Kahng, Daniel Shaviro, Alan Viard, Howard Erichson, and Brian Galle for comments on
earlier drafts, and Jannon Stein for research assistance.  Many thanks to helpful
participants at the NYU Law School Tax Policy Colloquium, the Seattle University School
of Law faculty workshop, the Fordham Law School faculty workshop, and the National Tax
Association Annual Meeting.  All errors remain my own.
1 Attributed to Leona Helmsley by her maid.  Maid Testifies Helmsley Denied Paying
Taxes, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1989, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/12/nyregion/
maid-testifies-helmsley-denied-paying-taxes.html?smid=pl-share.
2 “[T]he law of standing does not permit self-appointed guardians of the public interest
to challenge the IRS’s unduly lenient treatment of other taxpayers.”  Lawrence Zelenak,
Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income Tax, 62 Duke L.J. 829,
847 (2012).
3 See Section III.A.
4 See Section III.B.
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payers invisible by running deficits that impose costs on people who
do not yet exist, and by using budget gimmicks that pretend there is
no cost to government spending.  Treasury’s “Taxpayer Bill of Rights”
makes taxpayers invisible by recognizing tax fairness issues only in the
traditional dyad.5  Scholars have made taxpayers invisible by isolating
the tax system from the rest of fiscal analysis, and by assuming in tax
policy discussions that tax collected gets thrown into the sea.6  All
these institutions fail to recognize the complex relationship that tax-
payers have with one another.  A web of overlapping, complementary,
and conflicting interests creates a common bond that every taxpayer
shares.
No one has considered the effect of taxpayer invisibility on the op-
eration, conceptualization, and fairness of the tax system.  This Article
starts to fill that void by showing how the no-taxpayer-standing rule
has been applied too broadly for both doctrine and policy.  It explains
why invisibility has denied taxpayers both economic and political
rights.  It argues that taxpayers should have standing to challenge the
illegal and unconstitutional burdens of taxation that they bear.  Illegal
tax burdens are application of law that are clearly contrary to the
terms of a statute or interpretations of the Supreme Court.  Unconsti-
tutional tax burdens are laws and their application that violate consti-
tutional constraints.  If taxpayers are not permitted to sue, another
institutional mechanism should protect their interests.
Consideration of invisible taxpayers enriches the debate on tax fair-
ness.  Recognizing people excluded from the traditional dyad shows
how tax fairness demands that government institutions treat taxpayers
as people.  Because of its vast reach, the tax system may offer the best
test of whether we govern ourselves fairly.  This Article develops the
idea of democratic fairness in taxation as a norm that is separate and
independent of economic fairness.  People are autonomous individu-
5 Adopted on June 10, 2014.  IRS Adopts “Taxpayer Bill of Rights;” 10 Provisions To Be
Highlighted on IRS.gov, in Publication 1, https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/irs-adopts-tax
payer-bill-of-rights-10-provisions-to-be-highlighted-on-irsgov-in-publication-1 (last visited
June 14, 2016).  The bill of rights includes the following principle:
The Right to a Fair and Just Tax System:  Taxpayers have the right to expect
the tax system to consider facts and circumstances that might affect their un-
derlying liabilities, ability to pay, or ability to provide information timely.
See IRS, Taxpayer Bill of Rights (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1.pdf.
6 Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 417, 517 (1952).
The traditional way of proceeding analytically has been simply to ignore the
expenditure side altogether and to assume that none of those who pay the
taxes covering these expenditures receive any offsetting economic benefits.  In
effect this results in treating the collection of taxes as though it were only a
common disaster—as though the tax money once collected were thrown into
the sea.
2016] INVISIBLE TAXPAYERS 619
als and citizens with rights, and the tax system must respect and rein-
force those rights.  No tax is justly imposed on an individual if it fails
to satisfy the basic rules of statutory adoption and constitutionality.
Every individual is entitled to be protected against taxes that are ille-
gal or unconstitutional.  Democratic fairness is generally ignored in
the tax policy literature, but it is a crucial element of tax justice.
Invisibility has led to substantial injustice for real people.  It has
allowed unconstitutional taxation to proceed without challenge.  Judi-
cial abstention has reduced the role of courts in taxation to a very
narrow one, while simultaneously allowing unchecked discretion for
both Congress and the Internal Revenue Service.  Courts are the pri-
mary defenders of individual rights against government coercion, but
the standing rules keep taxpayers out of the litigation process, so their
interests are never considered.7  Tax expenditures contain important
policies that privilege some taxpayers over others.  Congress (by de-
signing a provision as a tax expenditure) and the IRS (by choosing to
treat a taxpayer better than allowed by law) have the power to de-
prive the federal courts of the opportunity to review their actions,
even if those actions are unconstitutional.  There is an imbalance of
power in this structure.  As the tax law is increasingly the locus of
important federal policy, it is increasingly troubling that the scope for
judicial review of its potential unconstitutionality is contracting.  We
need a legal mechanism to consider invisible taxpayers because dis-
tributive justice and democratic values demand that they be taken into
account under the law.  Anyone who cares about fairness in taxation
should be concerned about the contracting universe in which legal dis-
putes about taxation are resolved.
This Article proceeds as follows.  In the next Part, I describe three
important constitutional tax cases in which people with substantial in-
terests were not clearly part of the government-taxpayer dyad.  These
cases are intended to illustrate the problem of invisible taxpayers, and
they provide concrete examples for the later analysis.  Unconstitu-
tional taxation is the most troubling legal consequence of invisible tax-
payers, and the most important opportunity for courts to intervene.
Part III takes a closer look at why some taxpayers are legally invisible.
It examines the doctrines that produce invisibility, first explaining how
the standing rules create invisibility for taxpayers and how tax ex-
penditures create invisibility for laws.  Part III.A argues, as a doctrinal
7 See Lynn D. Lu, Standing in the Shadow of Tax Exceptionalism:  Expanding Access to
Judicial Review of Federal Agency Rules, 66 Admin. L. Rev. 73, 95 (2014) (“Standing
doctrine has played a crucial role in restricting parties’ access to federal court to seek judi-
cial review of government agency action and to enjoin violations of federal law.”); Gene R.
Nichol Jr., Standing for Privilege:  The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 301, 304
(2002) (the standing rule “systematically favors the powerful over the powerless”).
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matter, that conventional standing doctrine can accommodate broader
taxpayer access if courts acknowledge the financial interrelatedness of
taxpayers.  It proposes a theory of injury determined by “legal tax
shares” composed of validly adopted tax rules that are consistent with
the Constitution; taxpayers suffer injuries when they are obligated to
pay more than their shares.  The argument maintains that taxpayers
outside the traditional dyad who pay more than their legal share suffer
injuries that suffice for standing, consistent with current law standing
doctrine.
Part III.B discusses tax expenditures.  It analyzes tax expenditures
as tax law, challenging the conventional tax policy approach that as-
sumes that tax expenditures should be legally analyzed like their eco-
nomically equivalent direct spending programs.8  Consequently, it
argues that tax expenditures should be subject to constitutional re-
view, along with every other provision of the tax law, and that the
Supreme Court’s 2011 decision to shield tax expenditures from judi-
cial review9 produces unfairness.
Reflecting on invisible taxpayers and invisible laws, Part IV con-
tains the Article’s policy arguments about the rule of law.  It contends
that invisibility deprives taxpayers of fairness in two ways:  (1) eco-
nomically, by misallocating financial burdens, and (2) democratically,
by denying procedural justice and disregarding taxpayer interests in
the public ordering.  While tax policy regularly focuses on financial
burdens, democratic fairness in taxation has received little attention.
While this Article’s main contribution is in making the invisible ap-
parent, Part V considers some solutions to the problem of invisibility,
with practicality as a primary goal.  It concedes that prudential stand-
ing limitations may be appropriate to prevent a flood of taxpayer chal-
lenges, even where legal-share injury would satisfy constitutional
standing requirements.  It proposes an institutional structure for
bringing suit on behalf of invisible taxpayers in order to channel litiga-
8 Analyzing tax expenditures economically is the main contribution of tax expenditure
analysis.  See Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform vii (1973); Stanley S. Surrey &
Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 3 (1985) (governments can grant monetary assistance
in many forms, including tax provisions that depart from a normative baseline).  The exam-
ination of tax expenditures as their economic equivalents is standard in the tax policy liter-
ature.  See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress:  How Tax
Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1, 3
(2010); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Hidden Hand of Government Spending, Regulation 18
(Fall 2010), http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv33n3/regv33n3-2.pdf; Victor Thuronyi,
Tax Expenditures:  A Reassessment, 1988 Duke L.J. 1155, 1186-88.  The debates in the
literature consider whether an item is a tax expenditure or a base defining provision, but
they do not challenge the conventional treatment of tax expenditures on economic terms.
See, e.g., Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation—Tax Expenditure or Proper Allow-
ance for Measuring Net Income?, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1979).
9 See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 152 (2011).
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tion in the public interest.  Short of increased litigation, administrative
procedures within the IRS and more expansive decisionmaking in
cases involving the traditional dyad may go a long way towards recog-
nition for those who are currently invisible.  Acknowledgement that
there are invisible taxpayers who suffer injuries that the tax system
should protect is an important first step toward tax justice.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL TAX CASES WITHOUT PLAINTIFFS
The problem of invisible taxpayers is most troubling in constitu-
tional cases.  While it is frustrating that people cannot complain that
their neighbors are cheats, unconstitutional taxation is a more serious
matter.  Some constitutional cases simply require finding a proper
plaintiff—in the tax context that means someone who has personally
suffered from the government’s application of the law to his tax deter-
mination.  But there are a surprising number of important constitu-
tional tax cases in which there is nobody with standing to sue under
current law.  This is troubling as a policy matter, even if it is accept-
able as a legal matter.10
Two of the leading precedents on standing are tax cases: Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon11 and Allen v.
Wright.12  The former attacked the government’s newly adopted stan-
dards for granting tax exemption to hospitals and the latter attacked
the IRS’ allowance of tax exemption to racially discriminatory
schools.  The plaintiffs in each case were not the potentially exempt
taxpayer.  Nevertheless, they were people with real personal interests
in the cases and who should have been beneficiaries of the policies
behind the exemption.  Even though the purpose of exemption is to
subsidize private organizations that produce third-party benefits,
those third parties have no standing to complain.13  The issue of tax
exemption for charities only makes its way to court on the request of
the party seeking exemption.  That party can even get a declaratory
judgment on its eligibility.14  But only the government can question
whether an exemption should be revoked. As a practical matter, that
means exemption cases are rarely litigated, and there is a dearth of
10 See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) (“The
assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not
a reason to find standing.”).
11 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
12 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
13 For an excellent discussion of these cases, see Lu, note 7.
14 IRC § 7428.
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case law on the meaning of charity as a result.15  Possibly the most
important litigated exemption case concerned Bob Jones University.
A. Bob Jones University: Racial Discrimination
In Bob Jones University v. United States,16 the Supreme Court up-
held the denial of tax exemption for racially discriminatory schools on
the ground that exempt organizations may not violate public policy.
Even though the Court declined to embrace a constitutional holding,
the issue of tax exemptions for racially discriminatory schools was cer-
tainly an issue of equal protection.17  Exemption cases are particularly
likely to raise constitutional questions because exemption is inconsis-
tent with activities that are contrary to public policies.18  Standing was
not initially an issue in Bob Jones because the university brought suit
when the IRS revoked its exemption.  If the IRS had insisted on tax-
ing the institution, then the government would have effectively repre-
sented all others who were harmed by that exemption, either directly
(like potential students) or indirectly (like taxpayers not entitled to
exemption for any reason).  But the twist in the Bob Jones story is that
the government changed its mind midway, and attempted to abandon
the revocation,19 which would have allowed Bob Jones to remain
exempt.
The traditional dyad would have then broken down because the tax-
payer (the University) and the government would have been in agree-
ment.  Only the third-party outsiders were aggrieved by both the
government and the university.  But being outside the dyad, they
would not have standing to demand that the exemption be revoked.  If
it had succeeded, the Reagan Treasury’s change of mind would have
deprived the Supreme Court of jurisdiction.  A separate ruling by the
D.C. Circuit in the nick of time20 made that position untenable for the
15 See Richard L. Schmalbeck, Declaratory Judgments and Charitable Borders (2011),
http://www1.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/resources/documents/RichardSchmalbeckNCPLPaperwith
Appendices.pdf.
16 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
17 See Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 Hastings
L.J. 407, 447-49 (1999).
18 That is what the Bob Jones Court said. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591 (“The pur-
pose of a charitable trust may not . . . violate established public policy.”).
19 See Olatunde C. Johnson, The Story of Bob Jones University v. United States:  Race,
Religion, and Congress’ Extraordinary Acquiescence 15-17 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law
& Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 9184, 2010), http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1076&context=columbia_pllt.
20 See Wright v. Regan, No. 80-1124 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1982).
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government, so it relented.21  But Treasury still maintained that the
government should not revoke the University’s exemption. 22
In its opinion, the Bob Jones’ majority recognized the injury suf-
fered by taxpayers who were not party to the litigation.  It wrote:
“When the Government grants exemptions or allows deductions all
taxpayers are affected; the very fact of the exemption or deduction for
the donor means that other taxpayers can be said to be indirect and
vicarious ‘donors’ . . .”23  This is extraordinary language given the in-
visibility of all those other taxpayers in the legal structure that governs
tax cases.  But it offers a model of how courts might consider those
interests as part of its deliberation in cases where there is a traditional
dyad that affects many others.24
Bob Jones illustrates how the IRS might deprive all possible plain-
tiffs of standing by giving the one taxpayer who has a right to com-
plain what it wants.  Fortunately, the Supreme Court did not allow the
government to snatch away its ability to hear the case, and the prece-
dent continues to stand for nondiscrimination in tax-exempt educa-
tional organizations. Unfortunately, Bob Jones is not the only
important constitutional tax case in which substantial maneuvering
was necessary for the Court to hear the case.
B. Windsor:  Sexual Orientation Discrimination
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor,25 the
most important case about equality and taxation in a long time, only
happened because the government maneuvered to maintain a case or
21 See Johnson, note 19, at 17.
22 At that point, since the government was not really at odds with the taxpayer, the
Supreme Court appointed an amicus curiae to argue the case for affirming the Fourth
Circuit’s court’s denial of the exemption.  See Johnson, note 19, at 18.  In a footnote, the
Court explained:
After the Court granted certiorari, the Government filed a motion to dis-
miss, informing the Court that the Department of the Treasury intended to
revoke Revenue Ruling 71–447 and other pertinent rulings and to recognize
§ 501(c)(3) exemptions for petitioners.  The Government suggested that these
actions were therefore moot.  Before this Court ruled on that motion, how-
ever, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
enjoined the Government from granting § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status to any
school that discriminates on the basis of race. Wright v. Regan, No. 80–1124
(Feb. 18, 1982) (per curiam order).  Thereafter, the Government informed the
Court that it would not revoke the Revenue Rulings and withdrew its request
that the actions be dismissed as moot. The Government continues to assert
that the IRS lacked authority to promulgate Revenue Ruling 71–447, and does
not defend that aspect of the rulings below.
Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 585 n.9.
23 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 591.
24 See Section V.
25 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
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controversy against its own legal judgment.  The Supreme Court’s
Windsor decision struck down a crucial part of the Federal Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA)26 and held that it was unconstitutional for the
government to discriminate against same-sex couples.  While gener-
ally known as the first same-sex marriage case, Windsor was more
technically a case about taxes. The specific issue was whether the
plaintiff should be entitled to spousal benefits under the federal estate
tax, despite DOMA’s refusal to treat her as a spouse for federal tax
purposes.
In Windsor, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to hear the case ulti-
mately hung by a thread.  If the government had refunded Windsor’s
money (as it had been ordered to do),27 or if Windsor had simply
never paid the disputed tax (which would have been the case if she
had started in the Tax Court), the case could not have happened.  The
Supreme Court made much of the fact that there was a justiciable case
or controversy under the Constitution because the government held
onto Windsor’s refund.  Physically retaining the money was sufficient
even though the government and the taxpayer did not actually disa-
gree about the correct interpretation of the Constitution; they both
thought that Windsor should get her money back.  The government
held onto Windsor’s refund despite the fact that the Obama adminis-
tration agreed that Windsor was right on the merits.
This jurisdictional maneuver is curious from a tax law perspective.
A taxpayer is entitled to an adjudication of tax liability without paying
in advance; to do so she must bring her case in the Tax Court.28  Only
if she loses does the government receive payment.  The plaintiff in
Windsor chose to bring her case in a federal district court, rather than
in the Tax Court, so she paid the contested amount and sued for a
refund, following the procedure for district court litigation.  The im-
portant fact to note is that payment is relevant to venue, but payment
is not determinative of whether a person is entitled to litigate a tax
liability.  The overwhelming majority of tax disputes are litigated in
Tax Court.29
26 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419-20 (1996).
27 See Windsor v. United States, 833 F.Supp.2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
28 The Tax Court is an Article I court, so it is not bound by the jurisdictional rules in
Article III.  But Tax Court cases are appealable to Article III courts, and taxpayers are not
required to pay in order to be heard by the federal courts of appeals.  If Congress ex-
panded jurisdiction in the Tax Court to allow broader taxpayer standing, the legality of this
scheme would need to be determined.  See David Krinsky, How to Sue Without Standing:
The Constitutionality of Citizen Suits in Non-Article III Tribunals, 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
301, 304 (2007).  The Tax Court has indicated that constitutional standing rules apply to it.
Anthony v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 367, 371 (1976).
29 Compare U.S. Courts, U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis of Ju-
risdiction and Nature of Suit, During the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30, 2012
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If the IRS had simply decided to allow all same-sex married couples
to treat themselves as married for federal tax purposes—in clear defi-
ance of DOMA—then no taxpayer would have been allowed to com-
plain.  Because a taxpayer disputing her own tax liability and the
government must always be the counterparties in a tax case, there can
be no other litigation that raises the issue of constitutionality of a tax
statute; a tax statute’s constitutionality simply cannot arise in litigation
between private parties.  If taxation were the only context in which
DOMA applied, the IRS could have created a legal stalemate.  Same-
sex couples would have had nothing to complain about, and other tax-
payers would not have been part of the dyad allowed to raise the is-
sue.  The statute would have remained on the books, but the executive
branch would have not enforced it, leaving DOMA in an awkward
limbo, and depriving everyone of a final Supreme Court determina-
tion about DOMA’s constitutionality.  The constitutionality of
DOMA, and the larger question of equality for same-sex couples, was
important to millions of people who had no direct interest in Wind-
sor’s tax refund.  It was vital that the Supreme Court decide the case.
Despite its belief that DOMA was unconstitutional, the Obama ad-
ministration realized the importance of a Supreme Court determina-
tion on the constitutionality of DOMA.  So the Justice Department
and the taxpayer cooperated to ensure that there would be an injury
onto which the Supreme Court could attach a case or controversy.
The government held the money, the Supreme Court invalidated
DOMA, and equality was celebrated.
C. Hernandez:  Establishment of Religion
Not all cases have such a happy ending.  Where the IRS administers
the law in an unconstitutional way, the Supreme Court may be de-
prived of any opportunity to review the practice.  This is the story of
Hernandez v. Commissioner,30 which concerned the charitable deduc-
tion allowance for payments made to the Church of Scientology.  In
Hernandez, the Court refused to allow Scientologists to deduct their
payments to the church for “auditing and training.”31  The grounds for
its decision were statutory—the Court relied on its interpretation of
the statutory requirements for the charitable deduction, which include
and 2013, at 4 (2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-2/judicial-business/2013/09/
30 (1113 tax cases in district courts), with IRS, Data Book, 2013, at 61 (2013), https://www
.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/13databk.pdf (21,837 cases in Tax Court).
30 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
31 From a tax perspective, it is an unfortunate name for Scientologists to use for their
form of devotional activity.
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the making of a “contribution or gift.”32  The Court held that the pay-
ments did not satisfy the statute because they were quid pro quo for
services received from the church,33 rather than a contribution or
gift.34  In treating the payments as purchases, rather than contribu-
tions, the Court concluded that the payments did not qualify for the
§ 170 deduction.35  Just to be clear:  At the Supreme Court, the gov-
ernment won and the Scientologists lost.
After the Court’s decision, the IRS—which had prevailed in the liti-
gation—changed its position and decided to allow Scientologists to
deduct their auditing payments as charitable contributions.  The IRS
entered into an agreement with the Church of Scientology detailing
the change, and revoked its prior guidance disallowing members’ de-
ductions.36  The IRS essentially overruled the Supreme Court.37
Of course, the IRS lacked the power to overrule the result in Her-
nandez; Hernandez was a Supreme Court case interpreting a statutory
provision.  Treasury is bound by statute, and by the Court’s interpreta-
tion of a statute.  It is unlawful for a government to impose tax incon-
sistent with that interpretation.  If the Supreme Court interprets a
statute contrary to congressional intent, Congress has the power to
clarify by amending the law.38  Congress could have made clear that
the Supreme Court’s interpretation was inconsistent with its policies
by explicitly adopting a deduction for Scientologists.  But Congress
chose not to do so during the four years between the Hernandez deci-
sion and the IRS closing agreement.  Its reticence is not surprising,
given the Establishment Clause concerns raised by special treatment
for a single religion.
Twenty years later, the status quo holds.  No one can attack the
IRS’ excessively generous treatment of members of the Church of
Scientology.  Scientologists have no complaint, and other taxpayers
have no standing to complain.  Taxpayers can only complain about
their own tax liability and hope that a court will direct the IRS to
32 IRC § 170(c).
33 Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 692-94.
34 “A gift in the statutory sense . . . proceeds from a ‘detached and disinterested gener-
osity,’ . . . ‘out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses.’” Commissioner v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (citations omitted).
35 Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 694.
36 Rev. Rul. 93-73, 1993-2 C.B. 75, obsoleting Rev. Rul. 78-189, 1978-1 C.B. 68.  Al-
though the closing agreement was allegedly secret, it was, in fact, widely available.  See
Elizabeth MacDonald, Scientologists and IRS Settle for $12.5 Million, Wall St. J., Dec. 30,
1997, at A12; Closing Agreement Between IRS and Church of Scientology, 97 TNT 251-24
(Dec. 31, 1997), LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
37 The same problem has also arisen in nonconstitutional contexts.  See Gregg D. Pol-
sky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 185 (2004).
38 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpre-
tation Decisions, 101 Yale L.J. 331 (1991).
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revise its application of precedent.  While they failed to get the relief
they wanted, that is precisely what one family did, twice.39
The taxpayers in Sklar v. Commissioner are observant Jews who
claimed a charitable deduction for the cost of religious school tuition
paid for their children.  The IRS disallowed the deduction because
there is long-established precedent that no deduction is allowed for
religious school tuition.40  The government’s rejection of the Sklars’
claimed deduction increased their tax liability, entitling them to a judi-
cial determination about whether the IRS’ additional assessment was
warranted.  They clearly had standing to argue that they should be
allowed the deduction.
In making their case, the Sklars argued that they should be allowed
a deduction for their payments because the IRS was allowing mem-
bers of the Church of Scientology to deduct their equivalent payments
for religious training.  They alleged that the restriction of the deduc-
tion to members of a single religion violated the Establishment
Clause, so that either their deduction (and equivalent claims by all
religions) should be allowed, or Scientologists should not be allowed
to claim the deduction.41  Even though standing was not an impedi-
ment to the Sklars, they were still unable to get the court to rule on
the constitutional question that really brought them there.
The Ninth Circuit pointedly refused to decide the constitutional
question, even though it had a lot to say about the government’s
Scientology policy.  It wrote:  “[W]e would likely conclude, were we to
reach the issue, that the [pro-Scientology] policy must be invalidated
on the ground that it violates either the Internal Revenue Code or the
Establishment Clause.”42  It further stated:
Because the facial preference for the Church of
Scientology embodied in the IRS’s policy regarding its mem-
bers cannot be justified by a compelling governmental inter-
est, we would, if required to decide the case on the ground
39 See Sklar v. Commissioner I, 282 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2002); Sklar v. Commissioner II,
549 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 2008).
40 See, e.g., DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962); Oppewal v. Commis-
sioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972); Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
41 The determination to allow the deductions by Scientologists was an administrative
determination, not a legislative determination.  That distinction would have been relevant
if the challengers were claiming standing as taxpayers under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968), because the Supreme Court had previously narrowed Flast to exclude administra-
tive determinations.  See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 481-83 (1982).  But the Sklars were not taxpayer
plaintiffs complaining about the government’s decision to favor a single religion—they
were challenging their own tax liability, which is always sufficient to give them a day in
court, so they did not need to rely on Flast.
42 Sklar I, 282 F.3d at 614.
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urged by the Sklars, first determine that the IRS policy con-
stitutes an unconstitutional denominational preference under
Larson [v. Valente].43
Despite its clear view of the merits, the court did not decide the
constitutional question because it concluded that the Sklars’ payments
to their religious schools were distinguishable from the Scientology
payments.  By distinguishing those payments, the court was able to
dispose of the case without deciding anything about the Scientology
payments.  To add insult to injury, in the Sklars’ second trip to the
Ninth Circuit, the court explicitly based its holding for the government
on the authority of Hernandez,44 even though the IRS had been ignor-
ing that precedent as applied to Scientologists—the actual litigants in-
volved in the case.  The court also explicitly declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the Scientology closing agreement.45
While the Sklar court’s approach prevented it from overreaching, it
was more likely too modest—there might not be another opportunity
for a court to review the IRS policy with regard to the Church of
Scientology.  No other taxpayer’s payment is precisely the same as the
payments made by Scientologists, so there will never be a case in
which a court has no choice but to decide the constitutional question.
Even so, the court could have found the payments to be legally com-
parable.  Thus, despite their clear case or controversy allowing them
access to the courts, the Sklars lost.  As a result, members of the
Church of Scientology are still allowed to claim deductions for audit-
ing and training, contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Her-
nandez, and in likely continuing violation of the Establishment
Clause.46
The closing agreement between the IRS and the Church of
Scientology is not a simple matter between two parties.  It raises a
constitutional issue that directly touches every person who pays for
any kind of religious training, and indirectly affects everyone else who
does not.  And yet, nobody can challenge the constitutionality of the
Scientology deduction pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s theory because
no other religion operates quite like the Church of Scientology.  The
Sklar court’s holding that the tuition payments at issue in the case
were unlike the auditing and training payments of Scientologists al-
lowed it to dispose of the case without reaching the question of
whether the IRS operated in an unconstitutional manner.  Since all
43 Id. at 619.
44 Sklar II, 549 F.3d at 1259-60.
45 Id. at 1267.
46 If a court were determining the tax status of Scientologists, the church would have a
legitimate interest in being joined.  But the issue was res judicata on account of Hernandez.
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payments can be distinguished from the ones allowed to be deducted
by Scientologists, no court will ever be compelled to rule on the
Scientology deduction, making permanent the IRS’ ability to unilater-
ally flout the Constitution, without judicial oversight.
Since the story of Hernandez has an unhappy ending, this Article
repeatedly returns to it in an effort to imagine how the law might
solve the problem the Sklars faced in their constitutional challenge.
The next Part extrapolates from the Sklars’ case to analyze the bigger
policy issue created by the narrowness of the traditional dyad.  It ar-
gues that the tax law’s recognition of only the traditional dyad rele-
gates millions of people to legal invisibility, despite their economic
importance.
III. WHY INVISIBILITY IS A LEGAL PROBLEM
The Supreme Court has substantially narrowed possible avenues for
constitutional challenges to taxation by taxpayers, while enlarging
both the discretion of the IRS and the power of Congress.  While
there are many old cases in which the Court decided the merits of
taxpayer challenges on constitutional issues without even considering
whether the complaining taxpayer had standing to sue,47 recent deci-
sions aggressively employ standing to slam the courthouse doors and
immunize tax benefits from judicial review.48  Tax expenditures—pro-
visions of the tax law that are functionally equivalent to direct spend-
ing49—have become nonreviewable because the Court now
characterizes them as the absence of taxation, rather than state action
favoring some taxpayers over others.50  The Court’s conclusion that
tax expenditures simply allow individuals to spend their own money51
is inconsistent both with its own precedents and the government’s esti-
mates that tax expenditures cost the federal fisc a trillion dollars in
forgone annual revenue.52  Tax benefits are an increasingly important
47 See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 152 (2011) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“Until today, this Court has never so much as hinted that litigants in the same
shoes as the Plaintiffs lack standing. . . . To the contrary:  We have faced the identical
situation five times—including in a prior incarnation of this very case!—and we have five
times resolved the suit without questioning the plaintiffs’ standing.”).
48 See, e.g., id. (majority opinion).
49 The official definition is in terms of revenue losses, rather than spending, but they are
equivalent:  “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a
special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special
credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.”  Congressional Budget Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3, 88 Stat. 297, 299.
50 See Winn, 565 U.S. at 142-44; see also Part IV.
51 See Winn, 565 U.S. at 142.
52 Tax expenditures are quantified by the government’s budget experts and treated as
revenue losses that reduce tax collections.  Treasury and the Joint Committee on Taxation
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(and expensive) tool of federal policy,53 so it is alarming that the
courts may be deprived—from two directions—of the opportunity to
consider their constitutionality.54
A. Legally Invisible Taxpayers:  No Standing to Sue
As a matter of Article III standing doctrine, taxpayers have no in-
terest at all in the tax liabilities of others because they have no legally
cognizable injury.  Standing jurisprudence treats taxpayers as atomis-
tic parties in potential conflict only with the state in the traditional
dyad.  In such a framework, the implicit assumption is that no tax-
payer is affected by anyone else’s package of taxes and tax benefits.
That assumption is false.
Contrary to the legal framework, all taxpayers are interdependent;
nobody who shares any of the burden of taxation can be wholly disin-
terested in any aspect of the system.  People who are treated as
outside the framework have real—albeit small—out-of-pocket costs
that are wholly created by government.  These government-imposed
burdens distinguish tax law from other regulatory schemes.  Standing
doctrine ignores taxpayer burdens and treats real economic injuries as
though they do not exist; a taxpayer is invisible in the legal regime
unless he is complaining about a liability that appears on his own tax
return.  The standing rules treat him as though he has no complaint,
with the consequence that substantive rulings that courts make on tax
issues ignore his interests.
This narrow dyadic framework is inconsistent with the perspective
of the federal government.  Aggregate tax collections enable the state
to function, so the design and operation of the tax system matters to
every taxpayer.  Individuals paying their modest bills may not each
matter to the treasury, but the aggregation of their tax payments en-
each measure the revenue loss from tax expenditures annually.  See Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United
States, Fiscal Year 2016 (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/
fy2016/assets/spec.pdf; Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 112th Cong., Estimates of Federal
Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2015-2019 (Comm. Print 2015), https://www.jct.gov/publi
cations.html?func=startdown&id=4857.
53 Excluding defense spending, the federal government spends more through the tax law
than it spends through direct appropriations.  Compare Thomas L. Hungerford, Cong. Re-
search Serv., Rl34622, Tax Expenditures and the Federal Budget 13 (June 1, 2011), https://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34622.pdf (tax expenditures produce over a trillion dollars in
revenue loss), with Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Fiscal Year
2012:  Historical Tables 167 tbl.8.7, 346-47 tbl.15.4 (2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/hist.pdf (showing $658 billion in discretionary
spending, excluding defense).
54 This was the central thesis of my article, The Great and Mighty Tax Law:  How the
Roberts Court Has Reduced Constitutional Scrutiny of Taxes and Tax Expenditures, 78
Brook. L. Rev. 777 (2013).
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ables the existence of the modern state.  Any legal institution that
considers the perspective of the state cannot ignore the economic sub-
stantiality of the taxes paid by invisible taxpayers.  Yet that is precisely
what the traditional dyad of tax analysis does by focusing on a single
taxpayer and recognizing only its conflict with the government, in iso-
lation from the rest of the fiscal system.
This Section explains the courts’ interpretation of the injury re-
quirement in standing doctrine, and why that interpretation makes
some taxpayers legally invisible under current law.  It considers
whether a reconceptualization of tax injury that recognizes taxpayer
interdependence would satisfy the requirements of standing doctrine,
and argues that taxpayers suffer real injuries that courts should appre-
ciate.  There is room in current standing doctrine to recognize invisi-
ble taxpayers, and the failure to do so creates both constitutional and
revenue problems that demand attention.
1. The Standing Rules That Make Taxpayers Disappear
The broad no-taxpayer-standing rule that has kept taxpayers out of
court is not a particularly controversial aspect of standing doctrine—
virtually everyone agrees that allowing taxpayers to challenge every
government decision in the federal courts would produce chaos.55  Ar-
ticle III of the Constitution requires that courts hear only cases and
controversies.56  The standing rules implement that requirement, and
ensure that the litigating parties have adverse interests.57  The Su-
preme Court has summarized the “irreducible constitutional minimum
of standing” as composed of three elements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) con-
crete and particularized . . .; and (b) “actual or imminent, not
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’ ” . . . . Second, there must be a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct com-
plained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the
55 See, e.g., T.W. by Enk v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.)
(“Without such a limitation, not only would the federal courts be flooded by ‘cause’ suits
(really flooded), but people who did have concrete stakes in a litigation would often be
thrust aside by the ideologues.” (emphasis in original)).
56 U.S. Const., art. III, § 2.
57 Some scholars believe that adversity is not required under the Constitution.  See, e.g.,
James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party Require-
ment, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 Yale L.J. 1346, 1355 (2015) (“federal courts
may constitutionally exercise not one but two kinds of judicial power:  power to resolve
disputes between adverse parties and power to entertain applications from parties seeking
to assert, register, or claim a legal interest under federal law”).
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challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result
[of] the independent action of some third party not before
the court.” . . . Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to
merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a
favorable decision.”58
This standard is easily satisfied in the traditional dyad, when a tax-
payer and the government disagree about the taxpayer’s liability as
reflected on his own tax return.  When a taxpayer is forced to pay
money that otherwise would be his to keep, the injury is clearly real—
a dispute over who is entitled to a particular pot of money is the quin-
tessential example of a case or controversy.  Consequently, taxpayers
always have standing to complain about their own bills, and the para-
digm tax case is one involving a taxpayer trying to pay less and the
government trying to extract more.  In that situation, the court is in a
good position to resolve the dispute.
The paradigm case also offers a good structure for the government
to protect the interests of taxpayers who are not before the court.
Taxpayers not before the court enjoy an economic benefit (albeit
small) if Treasury succeeds in the case.  Since all taxpayers pay into
the same revenue pot and receive the benefits of government, if my
neighbor pays more than his legally required share, then I receive the
benefit of government funding without paying the full price for it.  My
economic interest is served by a government that takes too much
money from my neighbor and spends it on me.  Thus, in the tradi-
tional dyad, the government’s interest parallels the interest of taxpay-
ers not before the court because those taxpayers will pay a smaller
relative share if the government prevails in the case.
Matters get trickier outside of that paradigm, and standing becomes
more difficult because of the injury prong of the analysis.  It is axio-
matic that a taxpayer has no standing to complain about an excessive
tax levy on another.  Where my neighbor pays too much tax, I suffer
no injury—he is the one with a case against the government, and he
must bring it himself.  In fact, I should be pleased because I enjoy a
free ride on his excess.  While we generally do not think about our
neighbors’ taxes in this way, such a focus shows how all taxpayers are
interrelated, for both good and bad.  Even though the legal rules sepa-
rate taxpayers into distinct units—each of which is in conflict with the
government over how much its liability should be—every taxpayer’s
ultimate package of government benefits and burdens depends on
every other taxpayer’s package as well.  Taxpayers have multiple axes
58 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (alterations in original) (cita-
tions omitted).
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of conflict and cooperation, but the legal structure encourages us to
focus only on the conflicted taxpayer-government dyad.
When the government’s substantive position changes from imposing
taxpayer liability to reducing that liability, the axes realign, and the
government is not a good representative for taxpayers not before the
court.  The government’s generosity to identifiable taxpayers imposes
no direct injury on anyone.  But taxpayers who are not part of the
traditional dyad suffer.  Every other federal taxpayer is harmed when
a favored few pay less tax.  Widely shared harm can be as real as harm
suffered by just a few, as is abundantly clear from mass torts and prod-
ucts liability.59  Yet under current law, those other taxpayers lack
standing to sue over the government’s generosity.  The benefitted tax-
payer remains the party whose tax liability is directly at issue.  He is
the only one potentially with standing to litigate his liability, but that
taxpayer has no complaint (and no injury at all).  My neighbor’s chari-
table contribution deduction does not directly increase my tax bill, so
the law treats the government’s decision to allow him a too-generous
deduction as none of my business.  Only if my taxes increase directly
by raising an amount that appears on my tax return do I have standing
to challenge my excessive payment to the fisc.  But that is not how the
tax system operates.  It is important to emphasize that the action I
would like to challenge is the government’s decision; I do not blame
my neighbor for paying as little tax as the government allows.
By failing to notice the interrelatedness of taxpayers, courts can as-
sert that one taxpayer suffers no injury when another taxpayer re-
ceives unwarranted generosity.60  Given the total number of taxpayers
and the enormity of total tax collections, the effect of interrelatedness
is small—one individual is unlikely to suffer much change in her over-
all benefits and burdens as another individual’s tax liability goes up or
down.  Because the federal tax system is so large, it is tempting to
ignore its integration as too complex and to discount any individual
burden as too miniscule to worry about.  So it is not surprising that the
Supreme Court has done precisely that when analyzing the injury-in-
fact requirement necessary for standing to sue.
In its latest discussion of taxpayer standing, the Supreme Court re-
jected any notion of interrelatedness and the broad interest that inter-
relatedness implies for any one taxpayer.  The majority opinion stated:
“When a government expends resources or declines to impose a tax,
its budget does not necessarily suffer. . . . It would be ‘pure specula-
59 See Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 459, 483-85 (2008)
(“the doctrine requires only that injury be ‘concrete and particular,’ and not ‘abstract or
hypothetical’; it does not impose any numerosity limitation”).
60 See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 143-44 (2011).
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tion’ to conclude that an injunction against a government expenditure
or tax benefit ‘would result in any actual tax relief’ for a taxpayer-
plaintiff.”61  The Court’s understanding of “actual tax relief” was evi-
dently the narrowest possible interpretation, consistent with the tradi-
tional dyad paradigm, but divorced from the economic reality of the
tax system as a whole.62  The Court limited its understanding of tax
relief to only reducing the bottom-line number on a particular tax-
payer’s return.  The holding seems to demand that a taxpayer—in or-
der to get a foot in the courthouse door—show that revoking an
(unconstitutional) benefit for another taxpayer translates into a de-
monstrable reduction in dollars paid by him.  No taxpayer can ever
make that showing.  The Court’s conception of remedy, limited to the
number on a tax return, is disconnected from the larger structure of
benefits and burdens of government, in which a taxpayer does enjoy
“actual tax relief” if her share of the costs of government declines
relative to the shares paid by others.  Although a taxpayer may be
able to prove that she pays more than her constitutional share of the
costs of government, the legal effect remains for purposes of Article
III standing:  An individual taxpayer has no injury when her share of
total revenue collected increases, as long as her total bill, in dollars,
remains the same.
The Supreme Court has conceptualized the tax system as function-
ally separable from the fiscal system as a whole, allowing it to ignore
the injuries that individuals in an interrelated fiscal system suffer on
account of that interdependence.  In denying standing to taxpayers
challenging a state credit for businesses, the Court said:
Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is . . . ”conjectural or hypothetical”
in that it depends on how legislators respond to a reduction
in revenue, if that is the consequence of the credit.  Estab-
lishing injury requires speculating that elected officials will
increase a taxpayer-plaintiff’s tax bill to make up a
deficit. . .63
This analysis reveals a truncated approach because it narrowly focuses
only on direct tax liabilities of an identifiable taxpayer; it is flawed to
limit analysis to a single “tax bill.”  Beyond that, it is flawed to con-
sider only the tax system in measuring injuries that arise in connection
with the fiscal system, while ignoring the combination of benefits and
61 Id. at 136; see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006).
62 The Court also based its explanation on dubious economic assumptions.  I analyzed
those assumptions in Sugin, note 54, at 817-19.
63 DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 344.
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burdens within the fiscal system as a whole.64  Burdens depend on the
net effect of taxes and spending, so an evaluation of injury must con-
sider both sides of that coin.  Accounting for interrelatedness, as this
Article advocates, makes both injury and benefits on either the taxing
or the spending side relevant.
The restrictive rules about standing would make better tax policy
sense if they aided the government in revenue collection.  For exam-
ple, the anti-injunction act prohibits suits to restrain the collection of
tax so as to allow the government to more easily collect revenue.65
But the restrictive rules about standing impede the collection of reve-
nue because they prevent suits that might produce more revenue.
Since taxpayers can always challenge their own tax bills, the standing
rules create a bias in favor of suits that ultimately produce less reve-
nue.  Government attempts to collect revenue, rather than give it
away, are always subject to attack because any taxpayer challenging
his increased liability is entitled to a day in court.  Constitutional chal-
lenges have been foreclosed only where the government is too gener-
ous to taxpayers.  Thus, individual taxpayers can attack the
government’s revenue raising attempts, but nobody can challenge the
government’s decisions to forgo revenue—even if those decisions are
illegal or unconstitutional.66
2. Invisible Taxpayers Have Real Legal Injuries
Invisible taxpayers suffer injuries that should be cognizable under
current law standing doctrine because they have real legal injuries,
defined by the tax law.  Taxpayer injury should be identified by refer-
ence to the legal rules that define economic rights in the tax system.67
64 See Edward D. Kleinbard, We Are Better Than This (2014) (arguing that evaluating
the fiscal system as a whole is the only reasonable way to approach tax policy questions);
Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and Limitations on Taxation, 72 Fordham L.
Rev. 1991, 1997 (2004) (“it matters little what the tax itself looks like [if] the spending side
of the budget corrects or adjusts the distributional consequences overall”).
65 IRC § 7421 (“[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of
any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the
person against whom such tax was assessed.”).
66 Even members of Congress may be unable to object because they lack standing to
challenge administrative application of a federal statute.  See Nathaniel S. Cushman, The
Impact of Illegal Tax Guidance:  Notice 2008-83, 62 Tax Law. 867, 885 (2008); see also
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Article III Double-Dipping: Proposition 8’s Sponsors, BLAG, and
the Government’s Interest, 61 U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 164, 172 (2012) (“[I]t is not clear that
Article III does or should permit the federal government to bifurcate its standing for pur-
poses of having federal courts resolve policy disputes between the executive and legislative
branches.”).  The Windsor Court held that the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group had
standing.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2686-88 (2013).
67 While this Article is limited to taxpayer injuries, this approach to legal injuries could
be applicable more broadly under the law.
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Any taxpayer who is assessed more than what this Article calls her
“legal share” has economic harm justifying legal redress—harm that
should count as injury under current standing doctrine.  For purposes
of identifying injury from taxation, it is important that the law defines
the legal baseline.  The concept of legal shares is a doctrinal one that
determines rights and obligations of taxpayers and government.  It es-
tablishes the relative burdens of government that the law imposes on
taxpayers in a regime that recognizes the significance of interrelated-
ness.  Constitutional limitations are necessarily part of the definition
because legal shares can only include taxes imposed by Congress that
are also constitutional.  A properly adopted tax must also be adminis-
tered so as not to deny individuals their constitutionally guaranteed
rights.  Unconstitutional laws (and administration that is contrary to
law) cannot be part of the baseline for determining legal shares.
Not every tax paid constitutes an injury.  The concept of legal shares
differentiates a tax burden that is unjustifiable under the law from a
valid burden that is imposed intentionally by the legislature.  For ex-
ample, renters should not have standing to challenge the home mort-
gage interest deduction because it is part of the legal structure that
defines tax obligations.  Renters’ legal obligation to pay tax includes a
liability that attaches to amounts used to pay for housing, even though
homeowners are legally permitted to enjoy housing on a tax-free ba-
sis.  Though it might be inequitable, the home mortgage interest de-
duction does not create an injury.
Congress has broad authority to adopt tax laws, and Treasury has
broad discretion in applying that law to individual taxpayers.  But
where either body oversteps its legal or constitutional authority, tax-
payers are forced to pay more than their legally justified shares of tax.
Any unconstitutional largesse by the government increases the rela-
tive shares paid by invisible taxpayers beyond their legal limit.  For
example, if the IRS decided to allow some renters to claim the home
mortgage interest deduction—without any statutory basis for such al-
lowance—other taxpayers, who did not receive the bonus, would be
paying more than their legal shares.  The agency’s decision in that case
would be illegal because the government would not be exercising its
allowable discretion, but would be purposely administering the tax
system contrary to law.  If the IRS refused to follow a Supreme Court
interpretation of the Code, the action would be illegal.  So, if the gov-
ernment continued to grant exemption to schools that discriminated
on the basis of race after the Court’s decision in Bob Jones, that policy
would be illegal because it would be explicitly contrary to the Su-
preme Court’s determination of eligibility for exemption.  If the IRS
had allowed same-sex couples to file joint returns prior to Windsor,
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that would have been illegal under DOMA.  Under conventional anal-
ysis, taxpayers who did not receive the bonus mortgage interest de-
ductions (in the first example), or did not receive tax exemptions (in
the second example), or did not file jointly (in the third example) have
no injury.  Those other taxpayers would not see their total tax liability
increase on account of the unlawful benefit granted to others. But
their share of total tax paid would increase, so they would have a
greater relative responsibility for the costs of government.  This is
what an interpretation of injury that acknowledges taxpayer interre-
latedness would recognize as an injury in fact.
The bonus mortgage interest deductions allowed to renters would
be illegal, but not unconstitutional unless the government’s largesse
was based on a constitutionally suspect classification, such as race.
Since the Supreme Court’s analysis in Bob Jones was statutory, rather
than constitutional, the government’s hypothetical contrary policy is
clearly contrary to statute.  It could also be unconstitutional.  The Her-
nandez/Sklar story is also an example that includes the constitutional
component.  The Supreme Court held that auditing payments made to
the Church of Scientology are not deductible under § 170, establishing
the law of charitable deductions on those facts.  When the IRS allows
those payments to be deducted, in blatant conflict with the interpreta-
tion of the law by the Court, it increases the tax shares paid by other
taxpayers.  It would have been enough for this analysis that the Court
held that the payments were not deductible, because the IRS’ largesse
to Scientologists is contrary to law.  But in addition, that largesse is
also unconstitutional because it favors one religion over others, as the
court in Sklar I described.
Because Congress defines the legal baseline—with the help of the
courts interpreting the statute, illegal tax shares are likely to arise
from determinations made by the IRS administering the law.  Where
the IRS refuses to follow the statute or the Supreme Court’s interpre-
tation of it, tax collections are not made consistent with the law.  Con-
gress’ power to design the tax law is very broad under both Article I,
section 8, and the Sixteenth Amendment.  But it is not unlimited be-
cause Congress may not adopt tax laws that deny individuals rights,
and unconstitutional tax shares can arise when either the IRS or Con-
gress trample those rights.  Unconstitutional tax collections may arise
from either administrative actions or the statute itself.  Those taxpay-
ers have been denied access to the courts, but their legal–share inju-
ries mean they have something they should be allowed to complain
about in an Article III court.
The Supreme Court was not always so dismissive of legal share tax-
payer injury.  The Court’s approach was more nuanced in its earlier
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considerations of taxpayer standing than it has been lately.  In Froth-
ingham v. Mellon, the first Supreme Court case to analyze taxpayer
standing, the Court described a taxpayer’s injury—qua taxpayer—as
“remote, fluctuating and uncertain.”68  It concluded that a taxpayer’s
“interest in the moneys of the treasury . . . is shared with millions of
others, is comparatively minute and indeterminable.”69  Though the
Court concluded that the complaining taxpayer raised no case or con-
troversy allowing for judicial review, its analysis shows that the Froth-
ingham Court recognized the real economic cost and interrelatedness
of taxpayers.  It denied standing because it found the interest too
small to be legally significant.  Again in 1983, when the Court decided
Bob Jones, it recognized the costs that taxpayers incur on account of
the interdependence of the tax system by noting that “the very fact of
the exemption or deduction for the donor means that other taxpayers
can be said to be indirect and vicarious ‘donors.’”70  In addition, mu-
nicipal taxpayers—who each pay a larger percentage of a smaller
budget—have always been granted standing more broadly than fed-
eral taxpayers because their injuries have always appeared to be sub-
stantial.71  This history of judicial recognition of taxpayer injury is
important because it contrasts with the Supreme Court’s current ap-
proach, and allows for a toe-hold that might support standing for
some taxpayers today.
It is significantly different to deny that an injury exists (as the
Court’s recent precedents do), and to recognize it (as Frothingham
and Bob Jones did), but think it too small to worry about.  Under
established doctrine, a small injury is crucially different from none at
all.  Class actions exist because individuals with small injuries have no
incentive to sue, not because they lack standing to do so.  Taxpayers
who contribute more than their legal share to the federal treasury be-
cause others pay less than theirs, as an economic matter, suffer a “con-
crete” and “actual” injury that should satisfy the Lujan72 standard.
Consequently, the Constitution’s case or controversy requirement
should not prevent taxpayers from having a day in court in cases of
illegal tax collection.  Once understood as taxpayer complaints about
government departures from a legal baseline, taxpayer claims that
they are paying too much tax fit well into the legal paradigm—the
plaintiff taxpayer is arguing that her own share is too high because the
68 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).
69 Id.
70 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983).
71 See Nancy Staudt, Taxpayers in Court:  A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood)
Standing Doctrine, 52 Emory L.J. 771 (2003) (analyzing cases of municipal taxpayer stand-
ing in federal court).
72 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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legal application of the law would allow her to pay a smaller share.  In
the traditional dyad, the argument is based on the government’s appli-
cation of the law to the complaining taxpayer.  But the same result
should follow when the effect arises from the government’s applica-
tion of the law to another taxpayer.  In both cases, the economic in-
jury is to the taxpayer, and in both cases, the disagreement is between
the taxpayer and the government (and not between two taxpayers).
Legal shares of tax do not depend on whether government benefits
are commensurate with taxes paid.  The balance of government bene-
fits and burdens is an important question for tax fairness, and must be
considered in designing tax rules.73  Nevertheless, fair shares are not
the same as legal shares.  The concept of legal share is a doctrinal one,
and can be understood without evaluating the justice of the fiscal sys-
tem as a whole.  For example, deficit spending means that future gen-
erations will likely finance some of our current public consumption.
Burdening them with our costs might be an unfair thing to do to our
grandchildren, but it is not illegal for our generation to live beyond its
means.74  A legal injury is defined in reference to the legal rules cur-
rently in effect—regardless of their wisdom or morality.  In conceptu-
alizing legal shares, this Article accepts both the requirements of
standing doctrine and the substantive legal tax rules.  It challenges the
concept of tax burdens, and argues that a more accurate understand-
ing of the relationship of taxpayers to one another would produce dif-
ferent legal conclusions under current doctrine.  Since the law (as
established by the Supreme Court) denies charitable deductions to
Scientologists, the legal baseline for tax shares should not allow the
deduction.  Because Scientologists are deducting more than their legal
entitlement under current IRS policy, non-Scientologists are paying a
larger share of the total revenue than the legal rules require.  Taxpay-
ers who are forced to pay for a greater share of government than the
legal rules require should be allowed to complain in court even though
their excess tax liability is indirect, just as they can when they are
forced to pay more directly.
Non-Scientologists, and similar taxpayers who pay more than their
legally required shares are harmed in being denied access to justice.
73 See John Stuart Mill, The Principles of Political Economy 621-22 (J. Laurence Laugh-
lin ed., 2009).  Part V analyzes economic fairness, apart from procedural fairness, which is
the concern here.  I have argued that benefits taxation is intellectually incoherent.  See
Linda Sugin, Don’t Give Up on Taxes, 145 Tax Notes, 1373, 1375 (Dec. 22, 2014).
74 It might not be unfair if investments today produce benefits for future generations
that outweigh costs imposed on them.  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars, Dis-
counting Lives:  Intergenerational Distributive Justice and Efficiency, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 79
(2007).  Intergenerational equity is a complicated question beyond the scope of this
discussion.
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Their indirect economic injury produces a procedural injustice.  But
they may not suffer an economic injustice because the legal rules may
not define the most fair allocation of the tax burden – a theory of fair
taxation is necessary to determine that.75  Consequently, arguments
about legal shares and taxpayer injury are primarily arguments about
procedural justice in the tax system.  A taxpayer’s inability to chal-
lenge her own illegal share of tax liability is unjust because it denies
her the protection of the law.
If courts grappled with the interdependence of taxpayers, they
would be more likely to find a justiciable case where a taxpayer pays
more than his legal share of tax collections. Legal shares are a way to
distinguish tax liabilities that produce injuries from those that do not.
The problem under current law is that courts are unable to open the
door to some taxpayer complaints without inviting a flood of baseless
complaints.76  But legal–share injuries are a way to navigate this di-
lemma; it would not create a huge expansion of taxpayer standing, and
most taxpayers would still be barred from court.  But it would allow
taxpayers who are paying a greater share than the legal rules demand
of them to seek redress.  The requirement of injury in current standing
doctrine leaves enough room for taxpayers to litigate about whether
they are overpaying because they have been assessed more than their
legal share of the costs of government.  Where the government has
chosen to impose unconstitutional or otherwise illegal obligations on
some taxpayers, protection of the rule of law requires that they have a
day in court.
3. Taxpayer Challenges to Taxes Are Distinguished from Challenges
to Spending
One explanation for why the broad no-taxpayer-standing rule is so
well accepted is because courts and scholars have not distinguished
two types of challenges that are very different from one another.  One
is a challenge to taxes that the complainant is being forced to pay, and
the other is a challenge to spending that the government has chosen to
finance with taxes.  The no-standing rule makes sense where it fore-
closes objections to government spending choices, but not where it
forecloses a taxpayer’s opportunity to challenge his tax.  The rules for
taxpayer standing need to be separated into these two distinct catego-
ries so that claims based on paying more than one’s legal share are
75 See Section IV.D.
76 But see Susan L. Parsons, Taxpayers’ Suits:  Standing Barriers and Pecuniary Re-
straints, 59 Temp. L.Q. 951 (1986) (suggesting that fear of a flood of claims is based on an
inference and not on empirical data).
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distinguished from general attacks on legislative policies.77  The no-
taxpayer-standing rule, as it currently exists, fails to distinguish these
very different claims.  The no-taxpayer-standing rule seems necessary
only in the spending context.78
Frothingham was a case about government spending, not taxing.
The complaining taxpayer challenged a government appropriation, al-
leging that the federal statute, which allocated funds to states for car-
rying out maternal and infant health initiatives, was a taking, “under
the guise of taxation, without due process of law.”79  The prohibition
against taxpayer standing is most compelling when it is based on a
takings claim, rather than a taxing challenge, because the taxpayer’s
complaint in Frothingham was essentially a naked policy challenge.
The taxpayer was dissatisfied with Congress’ decision to legislate on a
certain matter in a particular way.  The case was a challenge to Con-
gress’ reasoned decision about what national health policy should
be—the core function of the legislature. 80
As applied to spending challenges, the no-taxpayer-standing rule
makes sense.  The courts are not the proper place to challenge laws
that taxpayers do not like—that is the function of the ballot box.  It
would be impossible for courts and legislatures to operate in the face
of constant judicial challenges to every federal policy on takings argu-
ments.81  The Frothingham court said:  “If one taxpayer may cham-
pion and litigate such a cause, then every other taxpayer may do the
same . . .  The bare suggestion of such a result, with its attendant in-
conveniences, goes far to sustain the conclusion which we have
reached, that a suit of this character cannot be maintained.”82  Unlike
Frothingham, invisible taxpayers do not need to rely on the takings
clause because they make a narrower claim about the legality or con-
stitutionality of their tax share.
The taxpayer in Frothingham was not in the position of invisible
taxpayers because she was not complaining that her tax bill was more
than the legal share she owed—she was not complaining about her
77 Justice Scalia has argued that standing doctrine is designed to prevent courts deciding
matters better left to legislatures.  See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881 (1983).  But see
Elliott, note 59, at 514 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s concerns are about Article II, not
Article III).
78 See Elliot, note 59, at 480.
79 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923).
80 See Scalia, note 77 (advocating for standing doctrine to address this).  But see Gene
R. Nichol Jr., Abusing Standing:  A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 635
(1985) (critical of the separation-of-powers approach to standing).
81 See Eric Schnuer, “More Than an Intuition, Less Than a Theory”:  Toward a Coher-
ent Doctrine of Standing, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 564 (1986).
82 Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487.
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taxes at all.  To the contrary, taxpayers who believe they are being
overtaxed often have standing—as taxpayers—under current doc-
trine.  That is the situation in the traditional dyad; a taxpayer has
standing because she is a taxpayer.  It is possible that the no-taxpayer-
standing rule developed because courts failed to see any complaints
about tax liability outside the traditional dyad.  Without the legal-
share conception of injury, the traditional dyad may present the sole
situation in which a taxpayer has an injury connected to her tax liabil-
ity. But the legal shares understanding of injury broadens the scope of
overtaxation and makes clear that taxpayers can suffer injuries as tax-
payers outside the dyad, when their shares are larger than a lawful,
constitutional tax scheme would allow.  Under post-Hernandez law,
Scientologists are legally required to pay for auditing with after-tax
dollars because the Supreme Court held that they are not eligible for
the § 170 deduction.  It is because of the violation of law as announced
by the Supreme Court by the IRS closing agreement that the Sklars
suffer legal–share injuries.  Taxpayers suffer injuries when they pay
too much tax on account of the goverment’s unlawful decision to col-
lect too little from others, as the Hernandez story makes clear.
A careful application of standing doctrine that acknowledges the
injuries that taxpayers suffer in paying more than their legal shares
would not open the floodgates that the Frothingham court feared.
Treating only legal-share injuries as injuries does not mean that any-
one should be able to complain about any government spending deci-
sion.  Those who would challenge the legislature’s decision about how
much revenue to raise, or how to allocate that revenue to spending
projects would still be barred from court.  Political decisions about the
size of government and its priorities would remain beyond challenge.
But it is possible to carve out legal-share injuries from these political
choices.
The narrow category of legal–share injuries is well suited to judicial
determination because the disputes resemble the traditional-dyad
cases in which taxpayers dispute their own bills.  They are about
money—the quintessential subject of tax adjudication.  And the plain-
tiff is complaining about the government’s action, just as in the tradi-
tional dyad.  Because the government is aligned with a favored
taxpayer, the invisible taxpayer and the government have clearly ad-
verse interests, a key consideration for courts in determining stand-
ing.83  Except for the small size of taxpayers’ legal share injuries, they
closely resemble the injuries that standing doctrine generally vindi-
83 See, e.g., Michael Herz, United States v. United States:  When Can the Federal Gov-
ernment Sue Itself?, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 893, 906 (1991) (Article III requires
adversity).
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cates.  The question for taxation is who should pay, which remains
distinct from the question of what is being paid for.  Recognizing a
legal–share injury applicable to taxes does not create a case or contro-
versy with respect to government spending decisions.  When a tax-
payer suffers an injury that affects him only as a taxpayer, and when
that injury is a real legal injury because the taxpayer has a right to be
protected from whatever the government is doing, there is a strong
argument for judicial review.  This legal share approach to taxpayer
injury focuses on the relevance of a plaintiff’s role as a taxpayer.
Appreciating that an injury exists does not end the inquiry.  Given
the injury’s small size for any individual in the cases contemplated
here, there are legitimate concerns that might justify prudential limits
on taxpayer standing in such cases.  It is important to recognize that
these concerns, however, are not constitutional bars to standing for
invisible taxpayers.  For example, the slightly overcharged taxpayer
may have insufficient incentive to vigorously argue a case, even if
there are many others who share his fate.  Similarly, taxpayers are
generally unlikely to be anxious to complain about the liabilities of
their neighbors, given the cost and aggravation of litigation.  Conse-
quently, there is a legitimate worry that primarily tax protestors or
other harassers might be the only ones to come forward.  Even though
the Lujan standard84 is satisfied for some taxpayers when we concep-
tualize the tax system as I have described, there may be good reasons
to limit access to courts for legal share complaints.  Under current law,
the courts’ standing jurisprudence contains both constitutional and
prudential components, so the Supreme Court has a great deal of dis-
cretion over how these disputes might proceed.85  Prudential standing
rules can effectively keep disgruntled taxpayers off the courts’ dock-
ets.  If limitations on the legal-share justification for taxpayer standing
are prudential, they can be abrogated where appropriate.  Thus,
courts can consider when justice would be served by allowing litiga-
tion over the too generous treatment that the government is bestow-
ing on some taxpayers.  The point here is that the constitutional
contours of standing should not prevent legal-share suits.  In Part V
discuss some possible mechanisms that Congress and the courts might
employ to allow some invisible taxpayers’ cases to proceed, in light of
prudential concerns that might limit review of all legal-share injuries.
84 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
85 Heather Elliott argues that Frothingham’s taxpayer standing rule is prudential, not
constitutional.  See Elliot, note 59, at 471 n.65.
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B. Legally Invisible Laws:  Tax Expenditures
Some taxpayers are invisible in the legal system because laws deter-
mining their tax treatment are not considered government action at
all.  Without government action, there is nothing for taxpayers to com-
plain about; all tax litigation has the government on one side.  The
vanishing of tax expenditures from the legal landscape is a recent de-
velopment in tax law jurisprudence, and a particularly troubling one.
In 2011, in Arizona Christian Schools Tuition Organization v. Winn,
the Supreme Court made tax expenditures disappear from legal analy-
sis by treating them as the government declining to impose tax.86  The
Court thereby transformed tax expenditures from the economic
equivalent of government spending (with some legal resemblance to
direct spending) into private action completely beyond legal review.
Making tax expenditures legally invisible—despite their central role in
affecting the distribution of government benefits and burdens—was a
radical departure from their traditional legal treatment.
Tax expenditures are fundamental elements of the tax law and
courts should have the power to review their constitutionality.87  Ana-
lyzing tax expenditures as part of the tax system should mean that
their role in determining legal shares is subject to judicial review.  Be-
cause tax expenditures are adopted by Congress, they present a more
limited set of issues than administrative decisions of the IRS.  The IRS
decision with respect to the Church of Scientology, for example, was
contrary to both statute88 and the Constitution,89 and a court should
be able to strike it down on either ground.  Because Congress has
broad authority to define what the tax law is, its decisions are law.
Tax expenditures only need to be reviewed for violations of the Con-
stitution.  While that is a limited scope of review, it is far broader than
the Supreme Court has allowed.
86 563 U.S. 125, 142 (2011).
87 Many tax expenditures, including IRC §§ 107, 170, and 501, raise first amendment
questions.  Courts have sometimes acknowledged these constitutional issues.  See e.g., Re-
gan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (evaluating first amendment
challenge to lobbying restriction in § 501(c)(3)); Freedom From Religion Foundation v.
Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (W.D. Wisc. 2013), vacated and remanded, 773 F.3d 815 (7th
Cir. 2014) (evaluating parsonage exemption under the establishment clause).  Equal pro-
tection is also a potentially relevant constitutional limitation on the application of the tax
law, although explicit racial and gender distinctions do not appear in the Code.  See, e.g.,
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (evaluating equal protection chal-
lenge to tax-exempt racially discriminatory fraternal orders).
88 IRC § 170, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490
U.S. 680 (1989).
89 See Sklar V. Commissioner II, 549 F.3d 1252, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 2008) (dictum).
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1. Tax Expenditures Are Tax Law
Tax expenditures are crucial in producing legally invisible taxpayers
because tax expenditures are often the source of invisible taxpayers’
injuries.  Unlike revenue-raising provisions, tax expenditures provide
benefits that reduce tax liability for people able to claim such benefits,
leaving those who are not entitled to them with the bill for a greater
share of the federal budget.  Tax expenditures create winners rather
than losers in the tax system, so the “regulated” taxpayer under a tax
expenditure is one with a reduced tax bill, and consequently no com-
plaint with his treatment.  Those excluded from tax expenditure lar-
gesse have financial cause to complain, but they lack legal means for
redress.
Tax expenditures are provisions included in the tax law that are the
functional equivalent of direct government spending.90  Instead of the
government allocating funds for particular programs, tax expenditures
allow taxpayers to reduce their tax liabilities by participating in vari-
ous activities enumerated in the statute.  For example, the government
can subsidize mortgage interest obligations of individuals by sending
cash subsidies to borrowers (to help them finance their payments),
sending cash payments to lender-banks on behalf of borrowers (to re-
duce what borrowers need pay),91 or by reducing the tax bills of bor-
rowers by the same amount.  The federal government has chosen to
do the latter,92 designing the mortgage interest subsidy as a tax expen-
diture.  Yet the other choices would have been economically indistin-
guishable.  Tax expenditures reduce the amount of revenue the tax
law would otherwise collect, and thus, they subsidize individuals to the
extent their tax bills have been reduced.
The legal treatment of tax expenditures has always diverged some
from their economic equivalents.  As an economic matter, tax expend-
itures operate the same way as direct spending.  But as a legal matter,
because tax expenditures reduce tax liability, they are integral to the
tax system.  Taxes and spending are legally distinct and tax expendi-
tures are in the legal category of taxes.  This classification matters; it
makes tax expenditures part of the definition of tax liability.  Thus a
taxpayer’s legal share is not simply determined by measurement of the
tax base and application of the rates thereto; tax expenditures allow
some taxpayers to pay less money than they otherwise would on that
straightforward determination of tax liability.
90 See Congressional Budget Act of 1974, note 49.
91 See Bipartisan Pol’y Ctr., Restoring America’s Future 33-34 (2010), http://cdn.biparti
sanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/BPC%20FINAL%20REPORT%20
FOR%20PRINTER%2002%2028%2011.pdf (proposing this design).
92 IRC § 163(h)(3).
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It is important that tax expenditures are appreciated as features of
law because law creates rights and responsibilities.  Tax expenditures
give individuals legal claims to pretax income that otherwise would
have been subject to an implicit tax lien.  They bolster the property
rights that people have in their pre-tax earnings by denying the pre-
sumptive tax that attaches to all income in our tax system.  Conse-
quently, tax expenditures are crucial in defining legal tax shares, and
they should be evaluated on the same terms as other aspects of the tax
law.
As elements of the legal landscape, tax expenditures should be ana-
lyzed like other tax laws, rather than like pure spending decisions that
Congress makes.  Consequently, a tax provision that raises taxes only
on members of a particular group and an alternative that reduces
taxes only on that group should be subject to the same level of review.
If the group is defined by whether it has income from capital, or
whether it owns a home, for example, the challenges should be non-
justiciable in either direction as long as Congress has defined the cate-
gory of law.  But if the group is defined by reference to a category that
is constitutionally relevant, a constitutional challenge should not turn
on whether the provision is designed as a tax increase or a tax
expenditure.
2. ACS v. Winn Made Tax Expenditures Unreviewable
The Supreme Court’s most recent treatment of tax expenditures dis-
tinguishes tax expenditures from direct spending, squarely rejecting a
central tenet of tax expenditure analysis.93  But instead of adopting
the approach advocated here and treating tax expenditures as funda-
mental elements of tax law, the Court characterized them as Congress
declining to act. This is a radical change in the judicial approach to tax
expenditures.  Although the Court had never fully embraced the
equivalence with direct spending, it always recognized the legal signif-
icance of tax expenditures.  Never before had the Court treated tax
expenditures as neither taxes nor spending.94
In Arizona Christian Schools Tuition Organization v. Winn, the
Court was asked to review a state tax credit that allowed individuals
to reduce their state tax liability for payments they made to qualifying
scholarship-granting organizations (STOs).  For each dollar a taxpayer
transferred to an STO (subject to a limit), the state would reduce the
taxpayer’s tax obligation to the state by a dollar.  In the universe of
93 See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011).
94 My article, The Great and Mighty Tax Law, note 54, fully analyzes that case.  Some of
the discussion in this Section comes from that article.
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tax expenditures, the credit’s design particularly resembled direct
state funding since the state reimbursed the taxpayer’s entire out-of-
pocket cost for the payments made; taxpayers suffered no after-tax
costs on account of their (so-called) contributions.  Plaintiffs trying to
challenge the state’s decision to authorize the credit argued that since
the recipient organizations were primarily religious, the tax credit was
unconstitutional as an establishment of religion.  They claimed stand-
ing to sue under Flast v. Cohen,95 which had previously enabled estab-
lishment clause challenges to government taxing and spending on
religion, but lost on the standing issue.96  The Court interpreted Flast
to require both actual taxing and spending, and not their economically
equivalent tax expenditure.  The Court’s literal reading of both taxing
and spending did not include a tax credit that collapsed those func-
tions by forgoing tax collection as long as the taxpayer devoted re-
sources to expenditures favored by the statute.  In this way, the Winn
opinion rejected the tax expenditure analysis equating tax expendi-
tures with their economically equivalent direct spending alternatives.
But it did not stop there.
In the process of limiting the application of Flast, the Court had to
characterize the state tax credit as something other than taxing and
spending.  It treated the tax credit as a legislative decision not to tax,
and instead as taxpayers simply spending their own money.97  The
Court held that the tax credit was the government declining to impose
a tax, making it unreviewable.98  The credit was treated as a simple
reduction in tax liability, unconnected to any government program to
spend funds on identified purposes.  Tax expenditures became a foot-
note to taxation—an absence of tax.  This is the step in the analysis
that is most troubling because it is the one that places tax expendi-
tures above the law.  Tax expenditures do not need to be treated as
the legal equivalent of spending to be subject to judicial review, but
they do need to be treated as tax law.
3. Legal Rules Must Determine Economic Rights
The Winn Court’s approach to tax expenditures was analytically
problematic, in addition to legally novel.  For the Court to conclude
that taxpayers were spending their own money, it had to ignore the
larger institutional structure in which the payments to STOs occurred.
95 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
96 See Winn, 563 U.S. at 146.
97 See id at 142. (“When Arizona taxpayers choose to contribute to STOs, they spend
their own money, not money the State has collected from respondents or from other
taxpayers.”).
98 Id.
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Taxpayers can only spend their own money if the legal rules entitle
them to control over that money, or if individuals have a prelegal right
to those dollars.  The Court assumed that taxpayers had more robust
property rights than the legal system defining those rights actually
contemplated.  The legal regime determines what is, in fact, a tax-
payer’s own money, and the tax law at issue in Winn in its definition of
the tax base established that the money properly belonged to the
state, but also determined that it should be credited to taxpayers who
made payments to STOs.  Even as a technical matter, the definition of
taxable income is prior to the application of credits, which are simply
reductions in ultimate tax owed.  The Winn Court treated the amounts
at issue as the taxpayer’s own money because it assumed taxpayer
“ownership” without consideration of the state’s legal rules, which in-
cluded an income tax.  Under an income tax, part of a taxpayer’s in-
come is presumptively the property of the state.
The tax law is an institution that determines the contours of private
property—it is one element necessary in deciding what counts as a
person’s own money.  I can only spend my own money if the tax law
(and other rules) determine that it is, in fact, my money to spend.
While legal analyses of tax rules can—and sometimes do—treat eco-
nomic consequences as irrelevant to a legal standard, this approach is
impossible when the legal rules control the economic status.  Legal
and economic analysis must then converge because the relationship
between them is interdependent.
It was a mistake for the Court to treat the case as involving only
private action, rather than state action.99  The opinion recognized that
a government’s decision to collect revenue and spend it is a govern-
ment choice,100 but it did not acknowledge that the decision to allow
tax credits is also a government choice.  It was that decision—to adopt
the tax credit in its existing form—that clearly constituted state action,
and should have been legally important.  Because the challenged ac-
tions were treated as private choices that individuals made about their
own money, they were beyond the Court’s concern.  What could have
been analyzed as a question of legislative preference for religion in-
stead morphed into a case about individual liberty to privately spend
one’s own money without state interference.  The clear lesson of the
case for legislatures intent on providing government funding for relig-
ion is that as long as the legislature designs a preference for religion as
a tax benefit, it is beyond judicial review and legally invisible.
This result is substantially more radical than the separation between
legal and economic analysis of tax expenditures demands.  It was not
99 See Sugin, note 54, at 803-04.
100 Winn, 563 U.S. at 142.
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necessary to treat the tax credit as the precise legal equivalent of gov-
ernment spending to acknowledge the economic importance of the le-
gal rule.  The Winn Court could have recognized the role of law in
determining economic rights by treating the tax expenditure as the
government’s choice to reduce tax for some people.  The Court could
have treated the reduction in tax as state action in the tax system,
consistent with the traditional legal classification of tax expenditures.
As integral components of the tax system, tax expenditures are ele-
ments of tax law, regardless of whether they are economically or le-
gally equivalent to direct government spending.
Every provision that allows one taxpayer to pay less tax than an-
other must make that distinction legally.  Legal justification for
nonuniform taxation is generally easy:  Congress has the power to
place a heavier tax burden on some people than on other people.  For
example, it can decide that people with greater income must pay a
greater percentage of that income in tax; the graduated rate structure
is an exercise of Congress’ broad power to tax for the general welfare.
Yet not every choice to raise the tax of some compared to others
would pass muster under the Constitution.101  The broad discretion
that Congress has in taxation under Article I and the Sixteenth
Amendment is constrained by the rights against the government that
people enjoy.  So, while Congress may apply different rates of tax, it
may not impose higher rates on black people or Jews on account of
their race or religion.
The same analysis that would (obviously) prevent a special tax
charge on members of one religious group should also apply to Con-
gress’ decisions to reduce the tax of some people, but not others, on
the same grounds.  Where a taxpayer claims to pay more than his legal
share because he is unconstitutionally deprived of a deduction allowed
to others on account of his race or religion, the legal question should
have the same gravity as it would if his taxes had been increased on
that account.  Under current law, a person subject to a higher rate
imposed only on blacks or Jews may argue that the rate structure vio-
lates the Constitution.  But the legal system does not allow the person
101 Most attention to the constitutionality of federal taxation has been under the direct
tax clause in Article I, section 2, not the individual rights provisions.  See, e.g., Bruce Ack-
erman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1999); Erik M. Jensen, The
Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”:  Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 Colum. L.
Rev. 2334 (1997); Erik M. Jensen, The Constitutionality of a Mark-to-Market Taxing Sys-
tem, 143 Tax Notes 1299 (June 16, 2014); Calvin H. Johnson, The Four Good Dissenters in
Pollock, 32 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 162 (2007); Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the Constitutional Ab-
surdity of the Apportionment of Direct Tax, 21 Const. Comment. 295 (2004); Gene Ma-
gidenko, Is a Broadly Based Mark-to-Market Tax Unconstitutional?, 143 Tax Notes 952
(May 26, 2014); Alan O. Dixler, Direct Taxes Under the Constitution:  A Review of the
Precedents, 113 Tax Notes 1177 (Dec. 25, 2006).
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deprived of a deduction for the same unconstitutional reasons  to ar-
gue that he is being overtaxed, even though his overtaxation is eco-
nomically and legally equivalent.
Just as it limits direct collections, the Constitution must also restrict
the contours of allowable tax expenditures.  Only where the Constitu-
tion has no proscriptions can Congress decide the categories of tax
preference and liability.  A renter cannot challenge the home mort-
gage interest deduction on the ground that homeowners are treated
better than renters because renters have no constitutional (or other
enforceable legal) protections giving them the right to be treated as
well as homeowners.  The political process is the place to go to argue
over the rates applied to net income and home mortgage deduction.
Under the Supreme Court’s current approach to tax expenditures,
government spending via the tax law gets a legal pass because it is not
characterized as state action—even though tax expenditures contain
important federal policies in many areas.102  Tax expenditures are im-
portant in determining the shares that individuals pay.  Their invisibil-
ity is a substantial legal problem.
IV. WHY INVISIBILITY IS A FAIRNESS PROBLEM
The prior Part analyzed the rules that make taxpayers invisible and
argued that the standing rules in tax litigation and the privatization of
tax expenditures create invisibility, undermining the rule of law.  This
Part shifts from doctrinal analysis to develop an explicit fairness argu-
ment grounded on the principle that government institutions guaran-
tee equal respect and concern for all individuals.  While the last Part
focused on legal shares of tax, this Part is about fair shares of tax.  The
design of the tax system is a central concern for justice because the
institution of taxation is widespread, intrusive, and coercive, and the
invisibility of some taxpayers and some laws undermines fairness.
A. Legal Shares Are Not the Same as Fair Shares
A just tax system demands more than legal authority for disparate
liabilities; it demands that everybody pay a fair share of the costs of
society.  While fair shares may be more elusive than legal shares, an
examination of invisible taxpayers helps to illuminate what fair shares
might look like.  The principle of equal respect and concern highlights
a dual nature to tax fairness, including both procedural and substan-
tive elements, half of which has been mostly ignored in the tax policy
102 See, e.g., IRC §§ 25A, 221, 222 (education policy); IRC §§ 163(h)(3), 121 (housing
policy).
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literature.  Substantive fairness—which tax policy generally treats as
the only fairness concern—is economic.  As a substantive matter, fair
tax shares depend on both the benefits of government and the bur-
dens of taxation.  Fairness depends on the money value of relative
shares.  A substantively fair tax system allocates economic burdens
according to a defensible economic principle, such as ability to pay or
standard of living, and evaluates economic effects.  This is the kind of
tax fairness that the literature generally acknowledges,103 and
welfarists take it for granted.
But economic analysis does not always map precisely onto legal
analysis in tax policy.104  Legal analysis is broader, and procedural
fairness encompasses democratic values that are not reducible to dol-
lars.  Economic fairness is not sufficient for a tax system to be just.  It
must be accompanied by institutions that recognize that people (not
dollars) are centrally important.  Noneconomic fairness—what this
Article calls “democratic fairness”—is institutional.  It demands that
government respect taxpayers as equal citizens in the design and ad-
ministration of taxation, even where taxpayers suffer no substantial
economic loss on account of government action.  The small size of the
economic injuries that have kept invisible taxpayers out of court have
obscured the more substantial affront to dignity that the tax system
sometimes imposes.  Unconstitutional laws and administrative actions
that produce noneconomic harms undermine tax fairness as much as
outsized financial burdens even though economic harms provide the
key necessary to unlock the courthouse.  While legal-share injuries
should give taxpayers access to courts, tax justice requires that judges
maximize democratic fairness in deciding cases.
B. A Just Tax System Treats People as Equals
While people disagree about what constitutes the measure of a fair
tax system,105 a common theme in contemporary political theory
treats people as equally important.106  Under that approach, a fair tax
must treat individuals as equal and autonomous individuals.  John Stu-
art Mill, an intellectual forebear to our tax system, described a fair tax
system as one requiring “equal sacrifice” by individuals.107  Welfarism,
103 See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice:  Ruminations on the Benefit,
Partnership, and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 Tax L. Rev. 399 (2005) (comparing tax fair-
ness theories and the tax basis they support).
104 See Sugin, note 54, at 781 (discussing the “tension between the economic effect and
legal logic that is ubiquitous in the tax law”).
105 The precise terms of fair taxation differ under different theories of distributive
justice.
106 See Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy 4-5 (2d ed. 2002).
107 Mill, note 73, at 623.
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the dominant philosophical approach to tax policy today, incorporates
an equality norm because social welfare derives from individual wel-
fare, with equal importance attached to each individual’s welfare and
welfare maximization as the goal.  A Rawlsian approach to tax fair-
ness is also egalitarian because it demands that each person be treated
equally in the design of social institutions.108  As a government institu-
tion, Rawls demands that taxation treat people as “free and equal ra-
tional beings.”109
As an institution that defines economic claims, the tax system di-
vides pieces of the social product between individuals and the commu-
nity.  A government mandate of equal respect and concern is a useful
touchstone in looking both broadly and narrowly at how taxation car-
ries out that function.  Since it is a limiting principle in the design of
every social institution, there is no overall balance of equal respect
that allows disrespect in one institution to be overcome by excess con-
cern in another.  Equal respect and concern demands that all who are
affected by tax policy should be considered—even if not fully satis-
fied—in the public ordering that determines those claims.
From the perspective of equal respect and concern, invisible taxpay-
ers are problematic because they are ignored.  Current standing doc-
trine and the Court’s privatization of tax expenditures push invisible
taxpayers outside the legal system.  They are absent from the institu-
tions that administer the tax system and the courts’ review of them.
Invisible taxpayers’ interests are counted less than the interests of
those who are in a more conventional relationship to the tax authori-
ties.  As a consequence, they are unprotected by the Constitution
whenever their rights are implicated by someone else’s tax treatment.
Their rights to equal protection and religious freedom are less secure
and valued in this system than are the same rights of taxpayers who
are part of the traditional dyad.
Outsider status is a fairness problem, even if it produces no eco-
nomic disadvantage for those forced outside, because democratic jus-
tice is an independent demand on government.  Economic advantage
cannot make up for a failure to give each person equal respect and
concern in the institutional structure; government failure to protect
basic rights cannot be cured with economic advantages.  The overall
fairness of any particular tax depends on the background institutions
against which it is levied—a more equal social structure can tolerate a
less intrusive tax, while a society with great inequality might require a
108 See John Rawls, A Kantian Conception of Equality, in Collected Papers 254, 255
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).  Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax
Model, 64 Tax. L. Rev. 229 (2011), develops Rawls’ approach as applied to taxation.
109 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 252 (1971).
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tax system to do more for achieving justice.  The work that a tax needs
to do to achieve democratic justice depends on how well other institu-
tions perform in guaranteeing equal respect and concern.
Rawls’ theory of justice is instructive in thinking about this aspect of
fairness.  His theory is based on two basic principles in a hierarchical
relationship, with economic rights (in the second principle)
subordinate to political rights (in the first principle). 110  Legal invisi-
bility is a problem for the more important first principle of justice be-
cause it is about whether a person is being treated as an equal and
autonomous individual by the state.  Any economic benefit that
reduces tax liability is accounted for under the inferior second princi-
ple.  In this hierarchy, invisible taxpayers must be included in the insti-
tutional structure in order for the tax system to be fair because
economic benefits cannot compensate for the denial of political rights.
Equal respect and concern can be guaranteed indirectly, so the in-
stitutional demands of justice do not imply unlimited access to the
courts.  As noted above, the government represents the interests of
taxpayers not before the court when the traditional dyad imposes lia-
bility on a complaining taxpayer.111  But there is no indirect protection
of absent taxpayers by government proxy when the law or administra-
tion of the law unconstitutionally or illegally favors a taxpayer.  In the
classic case of an identifiable taxpayer at odds with the government,
the economic interests of invisible taxpayers coincide with the govern-
ment’s interest, so their economic concerns are represented.  In such a
case, it is likely that taxpayers’ noneconomic legal interests are also
aligned with the government’s.  But this representation only holds
when the government attempts to collect revenue.  Where the govern-
ment treats identified taxpayers better than others, the legal system
fails to recognize the losers.
C. Tax Fairness Is About Distributing Social Returns
The project of tax fairness involves determining how the returns to
social cooperation should be distributed in society.  Taxation is a nec-
essary institution in social structures.  As long as the tax system is just,
no one is harmed by being required to pay her fair share, and commu-
nities can expect to be made better off on account of taxation.  Consis-
tent with the demands of equal concern and respect in designing
institutions, the rights and interests of all individuals must be incorpo-
rated in the project of designing the tax system.  Fair shares can vary,
depending on which baseline is chosen to measure what constitutes
110 See id.
111 See Subsection III.A.1.
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gains from social cooperation.  There is no natural, neutral starting
point to evaluate fairness in taxation.  Some harms may not really be
harms at all—a baseline of fair expectations is necessary to decide
whether a person is treated badly.  Consequently, not all taxation is
ultimately injury. Only tax in excess of one’s fair share can be under-
stood as an injury to a taxpayer.
Baselines should reflect what individuals should be entitled to
preclusively control and what is justly allocated communally—we can-
not craft a theory of fair taxation without talking about desert.  Fair
taxation must consider what we each deserve as our private share of
the social product, and what we each deserve to bear as our fair bur-
den of society’s costs.  The most fundamental tax fairness question
asks what should be treated as individual property and what should be
treated as social product—how to carry out the basic function of taxa-
tion in dividing those shares.
There are many points along the spectrum from private rights to
communal ownership that people can legitimately claim as appropri-
ate for the baseline against which tax fairness is measured.  The base-
line itself is a product of social decisionmaking since it is composed of
laws.  There is no pre-social division between private property and
public entitlement—it is the function of government to determine the
proper distribution of the returns to social cooperation.  Some of
those returns will go to individuals and some will be shared, but which
individuals should have claims is an issue to be decided by social pro-
cess—democratic forces in the United States.  The ultimate distribu-
tion is the product of conventions created by law. 112
Invisible taxpayers are cheated in the definition of baselines under
current law because the baseline most widely used in tax policy analy-
sis is pretax income.  Pretax income assumes that people have entitle-
ments to amounts that are properly attributable to social factors.  It
takes too much for granted in creating the baseline, without subjecting
that baseline to the scrutiny that any just baseline must undergo.  A
baseline of pretax income creates rights without affirmative justifica-
tion.  It places taxation too late in the analysis of economic justice
because taxation must be part of the definition of social entitlement.
The instinctive acceptance of pretax income as the baseline for ana-
lyzing tax justice may be responsible for the invisibility of some tax-
payers in theoretical approaches to tax injury.  The theoretical
interrelatedness of taxpayers goes beyond the legal interrelatedness
discussed in the last Part because it applies not just within the fiscal
system, but throughout the whole economic system.  Recognition of
the web of relationships between taxpayers must inform fair shares.
112 Liam Murphy & Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership 8-9 (2002).
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Pretax income imagines the individual taxpayer as an autonomous
presocial earner, but that perspective ignores the role of social systems
in creating income.  Both recognition of interrelatedness between tax-
payers and acceptance of the reciprocal social obligations carried out
through taxation are inconsistent with the notion of any taxpayer as a
presocial earner.  When we recognize the interrelatedness of individu-
als across the tax system, it is evident that invisible taxpayers need to
be acknowledged and considered in the distribution of shares.  Tax-
payers are invisible because we pretend that it does not matter to one
taxpayer what happens to another taxpayer in the system. The design-
ers of tax law should recognize that benefits for some taxpayers create
costs for others, even where those other taxpayers have no standing
under either traditional standing doctrine or the interpretation I have
advocated. 113  While Part III offered legal arguments for why some
invisible taxpayers should have standing to sue, this Part argues that
lawmakers should think more broadly about distributing the burdens
of taxation across all taxpayers.
Shifting from a pretax baseline to a perspective in which there are
no economic rights without legal institutions demands consideration
of all individuals, including invisible taxpayers.  Since all individuals
are interdependent, both contributing to and benefitting from social
enterprise, the definition of rights and obligations in taxation should
consider everyone.  Fairness in taxation demands it.
D. Tax Fairness Requires Both Economic Fairness
and Democratic Fairness
If tax fairness is both economic and procedural, demanding equal
respect and concern in both aspects, fair shares must reflect that norm.
How to treat people with equal concern and respect depends on the
dimension.  The economic dimension requires that we account for the
real economic costs of taxation to each person.  Economic fairness is
concerned with levels of well-being, resources, or opportunities.114
These are the terms on which debates about tax fairness generally
take place, and they are important considerations in designing tax in-
stitutions.  Nevertheless, we should recognize that these debates are
113 Under my interpretation, taxpayers would only have standing if they suffer a burden
that is not justified under the statute or the Constitution.
114 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society (1999) (oppor-
tunity); Joseph Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice:  Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership,
and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 Tax L. Rev. 399, 407-10 (2005) (comparing approaches);
James R. Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity:  A New Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61 Vand.
L. Rev. 1129 (2008) (opportunity); Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Norma-
tive Standard in U.S. Tax Policy?, 60 Tax L. Rev. 155 (2007) (welfare); Daniel Shaviro,
Commentary:  Inequality, Wealth and Endowment, 53 Tax L. Rev. 397 (2000) (well-being);
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limited in the sense of considering tax fairness only in economic and
not procedural terms.  Democratic fairness is a separate, and indepen-
dent, measure of tax fairness.  It consists of treating individuals as au-
tonomous people with rights and interests that are important to
consider in designing and applying rules.  An examination of eco-
nomic fairness compared to democratic fairness clarifies the concep-
tual distinction between the traditional tax equity notions of
horizontal and vertical equity.115  A just tax system must satisfy the
demands of both economic and democratic fairness.
1. Economic Fairness
Economic fairness is not a concept that exists in isolation; it is about
relative shares in society, and is primarily a matter of social organiza-
tion.  Tax fairness is only meaningful in the context of other nontax
public (and private) institutions, and across individuals in society.  Ec-
onomic fairness requires considering the gross amount of tax that any
individual pays, but also depends on both how public funds are used
and levels of individual well-being in society.116  An individual’s fair
share depends both on his relative level of well-being in the society
and/or his share of public benefit.  Fair shares can account for both
abilities to pay and social distribution.
There is no prepolitical, natural level of taxation that governments
must strive to reach.  Countries vary in the relative sizes of their pub-
lic and private sectors, so the gross level of taxation appropriately dif-
fers.117  Excessive taxation in one country might be fair in another.
There are few tax regimes that are categorically unjust.118  Neverthe-
115 James Repetti and Diane Ring started down this road in their discussion of horizon-
tal equity.  See James R. Repetti & Diane Ring, Horizontal Equity Revisited, 13 Fla. Tax
Rev. 135, 145-53 (2012); see also Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and
Vertical Equity:  The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 Fla. Tax Rev. 607 (1993); Louis
Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 Nat’l Tax J. 139 (1989)
(debating whether horizontal and vertical equity are independent and meaningful norms).
116 See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Bush Administration Tax Policy:  Distribu-
tional Effects, 104 Tax Notes 1559 (Sept. 27, 2004) (focusing on financing of tax cuts); C.
Eugene Steuerle, Can the Progressivity of Tax Changes Be Measured in Isolation?, 100 Tax
Notes 1187 (Sept. 1, 2003) (arguing for expenditure distribution information in addition to
tax distribution information).
117 The United States is projected to collect 18.3% of GDP in revenue in 2015.  See
Cong. Budget Office, An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook:  2014 to 2024, at
20 (2014), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/45653.  Western European countries collect
substantially more.  See OECD, Revenue Statistics—Comparative Table, http://stats.oecd
.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV (last visited June 14, 2016) (showing the United States
at 25.4% for 2013, compared to the OECD average of 34.2%).  The OECD and CBO use
different measurements.
118 I have argued that an endowment tax on individual abilities would be such a tax.  See
Sugin, note 108.
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less, economic justice requires that government collect sufficient reve-
nue to finance the institutions necessary for political equality, equal
opportunity, and basic welfare necessary for individual agency and po-
litical participation.  Overtaxation is only meaningful by reference to
relative burdens within the context of a given level of government rev-
enue and spending.  Without knowing the extent of burdens across the
population, it is impossible to measure whether individuals are being
treated fairly.
It is worth drilling down further into the meaning of economic fair-
ness in taxation, and how equal concern and respect in the design of
institutions plays out.  All income in the social system is not the
same—some returns are more appropriately allocated to social forces
and consequently more appropriate for taxation than are others.  In a
society (like ours) in which there is substantial income and wealth
concentrated among very few individuals,119 economic fairness re-
quires that the tax system consider the crucial role of the social system
in producing income and wealth.  Where there is no good explanation
for the very highest earners to receive so much more than others for
their capital or labor, the tax system must account for the substantial
contributions of the social system.
Once we account for social institutions, it becomes obvious that we
all deserve very little of what we have.  A huge part of everyone’s
income and wealth is attributable to social factors.  The share of in-
come and wealth attributable to being in society increases as income
and wealth go up.  Social forces and social cooperation produce many
tangible and intangible things that contribute to income and wealth.
The advantage of being in society is enormous for people who do well.
Opportunity is also fundamental to determining the returns to so-
cial cooperation—those with greater opportunity to earn and invest
should be required to pay more from the fruits of that opportunity
than those who did more with less.  Greater opportunities for some
arise on account of the social system, which includes educational insti-
tutions and social connections.  Accounting for disparate opportuni-
ties is one way in which the tax system can be sensitive to the balance
of benefits and burdens over lifetimes, since opportunities at one time
may affect returns at another.
Nevertheless, it is important not to over-emphasize the importance
of opportunity in the design of fair taxation.  Economic justice is not
solely a matter of equalizing opportunity to earn.  It is not enough to
119 The top 400 earners had an average of $265 million in income in 2010, earning 1.31%
of total income earned by all taxpayers.  See IRS, SOI Tax Stats Top—400 Individual In-
come Tax Returns with the Largest Adjusted Gross Incomes (2010), http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-soi/10intop400.pdf.
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start everyone off in the same place.  This is the difference between
libertarian and liberal egalitarian theories of economic fairness.  Lib-
ertarian theories are more amenable to “starting gate” fairness.  While
Robert Nozick recognized that a just distribution is impossible where
people enter society with different resources, he believed that justice
would be achieved as long as everyone starts off equal, regardless of
the ultimate distribution.120  Ronald Dworkin explicitly rejected the
starting gate notion by explaining that a just economic system continu-
ally intervenes to affect distribution over time, as arbitrary differences
between individuals produce disparate economic returns.121
A tax system that is at all concerned with welfare must be sensitive
to outcomes.  Ability to pay, the most widely held norm relating to
fair taxation,122 cannot be measured on an ex ante basis since that
ability ultimately depends on how opportunities translate into out-
comes.123  An emphasis on equal opportunity implies a high norma-
tive regard for merit.  If economic justice consists only of equalizing
opportunities, then individuals are entitled to anything they can earn
in a level playing field.  That conception is not without internal diffi-
culties.  There are different interpretations of a level playing field, and
individual talent is a sticky issue for philosophers who believe in re-
warding talent.  But even ignoring those problems, that conception is
incomplete.  Even assuming that opportunity is equalized, social insti-
tutions still contribute to disparate outcomes for individuals.  An eco-
nomically fair tax system will account for how those institutions
contribute to the pretax distribution of wealth and income.  Merit can
only explain a small part of pretax distributions.  Merit distinctions—
like hard work—explain so little of the ultimate economic difference
between individuals.
Even if we could agree about what constitutes truly equal opportu-
nity, and even if we could guarantee equal opportunity for all, we
would not be finished designing an economically just system because
markets do not necessarily reward social value.  The conventional no-
tion of merit maps poorly onto market-based returns.  There are many
things to be valued that are not valued in the market.  Thus, even if
fair shares are sensitive to desert and recognize the role of merit in
120 This is Nozick’s challenge to Rawls.  He suggests that the initial distribution can be
whatever the reader prefers, including complete equality, because his point is that freedom
to trade after that moment will necessarily disrupt whatever the pattern of distribution was
at the start.  See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 160-64 (1974).
121 Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality?  Part 2:  Equality of Resources, 10 Phil. and
Pub. Affs. 283 (1981).
122 See, e.g., Dodge, note 114.
123 See Mark Kelman, Time Preference and Tax Equity, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 649, 656 (1983);
Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 Yale L.J.
1081 (1980).
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distribution,124 there is still wide room for taxation to account for
nonmarket values.  Economic justice requires recognizing social con-
tributions that individuals make that do not produce economic gains
for them.  The fiscal system should account for the benefits that teach-
ers, homemakers, and other underpaid individuals in the market con-
tribute to the social product.125
As an economic matter, we expect that a fair tax system will impose
economic burdens that are allocated according to a defensible eco-
nomic principle, such as ability to pay or standard of living—the two
norms underlying taxes on income, consumption, and wealth.  These
norms generally are treated as the standards for tax fairness, with no
attention to the fact that they are economic standards.126  As eco-
nomic standards, ability to pay and standard of living see individuals
as points on an economic spectrum compared to others at different
economic points.  For example, ability to pay compares income earn-
ers to other income earners, and justifies greater taxation for those
with greater income.  Consequently, economic fairness maps onto the
vertical equity norm in traditional tax policy analysis because individ-
uals can only be judged vis-a`-vis others in different places along the
same dimension.  Scholars who argue that there is no independent
content to tax policy’s traditional horizontal equity norm analyze taxa-
tion solely in economic terms.127  From an economic perspective,
treating equal earners the same is derivative of treating differing earn-
ers differently.
2. Democratic Fairness
The democratic dimension of fairness is distinct.  Starting from the
same commitment to equal respect and concern in the legal context
requires that we treat each person’s noneconomic rights and interests
as meaningful and protect them through the legal system.  It is impor-
124 Not everyone agrees that they should be.  Liam Murphy argues that economic justice
has nothing to do with merit.  Liam Murphy, Why Does Inequality Matter?  Reflections on
the Political Morality of Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 68 Tax L. Rev. 613,
626 (2016 (“The tax code should not track any conception of worth, desert, or merit, at
all.”).  But philosophers like Ronald Dworkin and libertarians believe that merit is impor-
tant in determining a just distribution.  See Dworkin, note 121, at 311 (explaining why
equality of resources is “ambition-sensitive”); Nozick, note 120, at 171 (adopting Lockean
property rights allowing individuals to “recapture benefits” of their labor).
125 I have suggested that these contributions might be considered in lieu of tax payments
in money.  See Sugin, note 108, at 249-50.
126 See David F. Bradford & U.S. Treasury Tax Policy Staff, Blueprints for Basic Tax
Reform 35-39 (2d ed. 1984) (comparing tax bases under ability-to-pay and standard-of-
living norms).
127 Utilitarians are less likely to separate out rights-based concerns from purely eco-
nomic concerns because utilitarianism can collapse both concerns into a single metric.
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tant to understand the tax system as a government institution as well
as a system that allocates market resources.  As such, the norms for
fairness look different from a democratic perspective, and tax-law re-
lated fairness imperatives more resemble the norms in other areas of
the law.
Consider why economic fairness is insufficient.  Economic fairness
demands that an individual’s tax liability is sensitive to:  (1) total gov-
ernmental burdens and benefits to that individual, and (2) total bene-
fits and burdens across the community as a whole.  It is tempting to
argue that confiscatory taxation—where the state takes all of a per-
son’s pretax earnings, for example—is per se economically unjust.
But even confiscatory taxation may not be economically unfair if the
benefits compensate for the tax paid—economic fairness looks at the
balance of economic benefits and burdens.  It is one thing for the state
to take all of a person’s earnings and leave him to starve, but it is
completely different to take all of a person’s earnings and simultane-
ously satisfy every material desire.  While we might not find such a
system attractive, the problem cannot be solely economic if there is no
economic deprivation.  From the individual perspective, economic
fairness requires considering whether a person is deprived of some-
thing necessary.128  From a social perspective, it must compare depri-
vations among individuals.  The objection to confiscatory taxation
without any economic deprivation is on political, not economic,
grounds.  Individual agency is a necessary component of tax fairness,
even though it is not reducible to market goods.  Nevertheless, it is a
necessary element in a tax system built on the principle of equal re-
spect and concern.  Democratic fairness is necessary to protect the
noneconomic interests affected by taxation.
As a legal matter, we expect that a fair tax system will impose rules
in an evenhanded way, and that the tax system will respect each per-
son’s rights and legal entitlements equally.  This is how to best inter-
pret the horizontal equity notion in taxation.  Understood this way,
horizontal equity is a completely different kind of norm than is verti-
cal equity.129  It is more procedural and concerned with rights, com-
pared to vertical equity, which is more concerned with money.
Horizontal equity demands that we examine the administration of the
law, and every taxpayer’s position vis-a`-vis the state and other taxpay-
ers.130  At a minimum, it demands that the law not be applied in an
128 See Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and Limitations on Taxation:  What
Rawls Demands from Tax Systems, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1991, 2007 (2004).
129 Murphy and Nagel treat horizontal equity as an incoherent norm because they un-
derstand it as a free-standing economic judgment.  See Murphy & Nagel, note 112, at 162-
72.
130 See Dodge, note 103, at 458.
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arbitrary fashion.  More expansively, it looks behind the economic loci
that provide an easy shorthand for evaluating fairness, and asks
whether people are treated with equal respect by the government, tak-
ing into consideration every relevant question for their tax liability
compared to everyone else’s.131
The democratic understanding of tax fairness is more robust (but
less definitive) than the economic understanding because it can ac-
commodate many more questions about how the system should be
designed by considering the proper role of nonfinancial differences to
tax liability.  For example, when deciding on the appropriate unit for
taxation, the demand to treat everyone with equal concern and re-
spect offers a framework for comparing people who live together with
others and those who do not.  Reasonable people can differ about the
proper tax under that standard, and whether households or individu-
als should be tax units.  Nevertheless, it is important that the idea of
democratic fairness invites consideration of how the tax system affects
identity, autonomy, and citizenship.132  Economic fairness has little to
say along those lines.
Democratic fairness challenges decisionmakers to look behind in-
come, consumption, or wealth to evaluate the burdens placed on dif-
ferent kinds of people.  Our system taxes undocumented workers
without giving them the rights that citizens earn from paying those
same taxes.133  Our system taxes people who work for a living much
more heavily than people who earn by investing capital.134  Demo-
cratic fairness demands justification for these disparate burdens.  Be-
yond economic comparisons, it can incorporate personal well-being,
choices, and rights into consideration in the design of taxes.  When we
ask whether the tax system treats people fairly, it is important to re-
member that the question is about people, not money.  That inquiry
necessarily includes whether we have incorporated peoples’ interests
in designing the rules.  Democratic fairness is also the rubric under
which the tax system offers individuals protections from unconstitu-
tional or otherwise illegal application of the law.  The economic ap-
proach to fairness, useful though it is, cannot accommodate crucial
noneconomic interests and legal rights.
131 Dworkin’s concern that individuals bear the costs of their lives for others informs this
concern.  See Dworkin, note 121, at 288 (equality of resources requires that people choose
the “lives to pursue against a background of information about the actual costs their
choices impose on other people”).
132 See Tsilly Dagan, Itemizing Personhood, 29 Va. Tax Rev. 93 (2009).
133 See Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants:  Separate, Un-
equal, and Without Representation, 9 Harv. Latino Law Rev. 1 (2006).
134 See Linda Sugin, Payroll Taxes, Mythology, and Fairness, 51 Harv. J. on Legis. 113
(2014).
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This investigation of noneconomic fairness relates to invisible tax-
payers because their injuries are most significant as democratic unfair-
ness.  Under current standing doctrine, the only cognizable tax injury
is a particular kind of economic injury, but noneconomic injury—
where a person’s rights and interests are disrespected in the institu-
tional structure—is not actionable.  Because the taxpayer must be
complaining about his tax bill, violations of his rights that do not
translate into demonstrably identifiable tax liability are not
redressable.  The only kind of injury that exists in the tax law is the
direct economic injury of being asked to pay an identifiable tax.  This
Article has argued that there are economic injuries outside that model
that should be sufficient for requesting redress, but the noneconomic
injuries are far more significant.  The cases highlighted in this Article
all involve constitutional rights implicated by the tax law.  Tax fair-
ness—in the democratic sense—demands that the tax system respect
and protect these noneconomic interests.  It is in the democratic con-
text that the rights of invisible taxpayers are lost because they have no
opportunity to be heard.
Once democratic injury is acknowledged, its effect on taxation is
readily apparent.  For example, by favoring certain activities (like en-
ergy exploration and real estate investment) or people (like families
with children), the tax system endorses particular social values.  Activ-
ities and people outside the favored groups are less valued in the so-
cial structure, which is inconsistent with the guiding principle of equal
respect and concern.  The plaintiffs in Allen v. Wright 135—black fami-
lies challenging the IRS allowance of tax exemption for racially dis-
criminatory schools—understood that their injury from the tax system
could be the law’s perpetuation of a status quo disrespectful of them
as equal citizens.  They were the same people with a real interest in
the outcome in Bob Jones.136  Edith Windsor knew that her injury did
not really come from the government’s withholding her refund despite
the court’s order; her injury came from the tax system’s operation to
treat her marriage as less legitimate than the marriage of a heterosex-
ual couple.  The Sklars could not have reasonably expected their de-
duction for religious school tuition to be allowed; their injury arose
because the government favored members of the Church of
Scientology over them.  These taxpayers were all invisible in the tax
system because their injuries do not exist in a world of only economic
harms.
Democratic and economic fairness merge to the extent that a legal
right is itself economic in nature.  But not every interest implicated by
135 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
136 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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the tax system is economic.  There are many legal rights in the tax law
that are properly independent of economic concerns.  Taxation is an
omnipresent force in everyone’s life, and it raises the most fundamen-
tal questions of the appropriate relationship of the individual to the
state.  Tax policy scholarship must do a better job evaluating that rela-
tionship along all the dimensions that taxation touches.  The tax law’s
broad scope as well as its awesome influence over so many
noneconomic policies requires justification.  Tax scholars have fallen
short outside the economic arena—even though taxation has long
been about much more than money.  The most important function
that tax policy scholarship can serve is evaluating the justice of the
government’s relationship with the people through taxation.
V. MECHANISMS FOR LEGAL REDRESS
A. Institutionalize the Interests of Invisible Taxpayers
The central objectives of this Article have been to bring attention to
invisible taxpayers, challenge the doctrinal framework that denies
them redress, and explain why that denial is unfair.  It is fair for the
tax system to impose burdens on taxpayers as long as the government
has properly considered their interests in adopting the policies that
burden them.  Invisible taxpayers can legitimately be expected to fi-
nance the state only if the tax laws are designed to achieve both eco-
nomic and democratic fairness, and administered consistently with the
Constitution. Under current law, taxpayers have no standing to com-
plain about tax regimes that disrespect them or unconstitutional tax
benefits granted to others.  The taxpayer-government dyad that enjoys
institutional recognition fails to protect the interests of others when-
ever the taxpayer and government in that pair are not really at odds
with one another, and whenever the absent taxpayers’ interest fails to
map precisely onto the state’s interest.  This Part offers several possi-
ble solutions to ameliorate that unfairness by bringing invisible tax-
payers’ interests to the forefront in the kinds of cases described in Part
II.  It is intended to suggest the way we should think about developing
solutions for invisibility, rather than as a complete blueprint for solv-
ing the problem.  The solution must depend on developing institu-
tional mechanisms that make invisible taxpayers more apparent.  Only
with established procedures and official recognition will their interests
receive the consideration it deserves in the courts and at the IRS.
Institutionalizing the interests of invisible taxpayers does not re-
quire courts to interfere with congressional prerogative or administra-
tive discretion, nor would it inexorably lead to an avalanche of
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litigation.137  Rather, it would strengthen the rule of law.  Since the
political process is unlikely to solve the fairness problems described in
this Article, this Part considers potential institutional approaches to
improving fairness for invisible taxpayers, without unleashing a tor-
rent of frivolous claims or requiring heroic interpretive changes by the
Supreme Court.
Other scholars who have considered taxpayer standing have sug-
gested that the Supreme Court reconsider its standing doctrine to al-
low broader challenges by taxpayers.  Lynn Lu examines Allen v.
Wright to argue that the tax context of some cases has created bad
law.138  Samuel Brunson proposes a radical broadening of standing
doctrine to enable more plaintiffs to bring challenges to tax adminis-
tration, in order to rein in IRS discretion.139  Heather Elliott’s com-
prehensive approach to de-constitutionalizing much of today’s
standing doctrine would likely enable more taxpayer litigation.140
While all noble ideas, I am skeptical that the Supreme Court will
soften its standing doctrine in any of the ways scholars have suggested.
To the contrary, the Roberts court seems inclined to use standing
more aggressively.141 Allen v. Wright142 is an old and important prece-
dent, and the standing holding in Arizona Christian Schools Tuition
Organization v. Winn,143 along with its sweeping categorization of tax
expenditures, indicates that a majority of the current Court is not in-
terested in opening the courthouse doors.  Those who care about just
application of the tax law will need to look elsewhere.  I contend that
there are other ways to address this problem without betting on an
unlikely constitutional reinterpretation.
In addition, it seems unlikely that the political process will solve the
problem.  Standing doctrine forecloses access to the courts for issues
that demand legislative solutions; the Constitution’s standing rules
perform a crucial separation of powers function.  Courts are best
equipped to handle cases and controversies, but Congress is in a bet-
ter position to make contested political choices.144  The putative plain-
137 Maintaining and controlling IRS discretion are both essential.  See Lily Kahng, The
IRS Tea Party Controversy and Administrative Discretion, 99 Cornell L. Rev. Online 41
(2013).
138 See Lu, note 7.
139 See Samuel D. Brunson, Watching the Watchers:  Preventing I.R.S. Abuse of the Tax
System, 14 Fla. Tax Rev. 223 (2013) (advocating that Congress allow “fire-alarm standing”
to individual litigants).
140 See Elliott, note 59.
141 See Jonathan Adler, Standing Still in the Roberts Court, 59 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
1061 (2009).
142 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
143 563 U.S. 125 (2011).
144 See Scalia, note 77.
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tiffs complaining about Bob Jones’ exemption, a charitable deduction
for Scientologists, and the privileged tax status of heterosexual
couples all faced the specter of a closed courthouse.  Could they have
gotten redress in the political process?
Who should pay more tax is generally a legislative question.  Taxa-
tion is politically salient, and elections are won and lost over tax pol-
icy.  Core questions of tax fairness depend on contested theories of
distributive justice about which reasonable people can disagree.  Since
there are no right or wrong (only inconsistent) beliefs about distribu-
tive justice, tax law should reflect whatever theory resonates best with
the governed.  The political process is the best way to reveal those
preferences.  The legal framework also suggests that the legislature
should be king in matters of taxation.  Under the Constitution, Con-
gress has broad discretion in imposing and designing taxes, and taxes
are determined primarily by reference to a dense and complex statu-
tory code.  Finally, the tax burden on invisible taxpayers is shared by
many people, and the political process is a place where people can
meet to further their common interests.
Nevertheless, the political process is unlikely to resolve the
problems faced by invisible taxpayers.  For precisely the same reason
that courts will not hear these cases—because the harm to each tax-
payer is so small—individuals may not even recognize their unfair
burdens.  Very few voters know about the tax system’s beneficial
treatment of a few taxpayers—how many citizens know about the IRS
policy of allowing the deduction for Scientologists?  The nature of tax
benefits for favored groups is narrow—many tax expenditures are not
quantified in the revenue cost tables because they are smaller than
rounding errors in the federal budget—though of course very substan-
tial for the favored taxpayers.145  Taxpayers are rationally apathetic; it
is not worth the average taxpayer’s trouble to pay attention to how
the tax laws are being administered for others.  Consequently, legisla-
tors are unlikely to be interested in solving these problems.146
Even where public interest might be heightened enough to spark
legislative interest, such as with the Windsor case, there is no guaran-
tee that the political process will produce a constitutional result.  Con-
gress might affirmatively decide to discriminate against gay couples
(or racial or religious minorities).  But that does not make the consti-
tutional violation any less serious.  Constitutional violations that favor
majorities demand the most serious attention from the courts, a tax
145 The Joint Committee does not include amounts for tax expenditures that are less
than $50 million.  See Joint Comm., note 52, at tbl.1 n.4.
146 See Brunson, note 139, at 261 (“Though ending the I.R.S.’s abuse of the tax system
helps taxpayers generally, the benefits are diffuse, and no legislator is likely to benefit
politically from engaging in such oversight.”).
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benefit administered in a way that reduces the taxes of Christians
(only) would be both unconstitutional and perhaps politically
popular.147
I am not advocating greater judicial access for taxpayers to chal-
lenge policy decisions that Congress makes.  Instead, I am arguing for
greater recognition of legal claims, and a more flexible approach to
identifying a claim as legal, rather than political.  The claim that the
Sklars made was legal, and not political, because it was about the gov-
ernment violating a right they had. Bob Jones and Windsor also in-
volved individuals who were being denied their constitutional rights
by the administration of the tax law.  Taxpayers suffer injuries as citi-
zens, but those injuries manifest as increased tax shares.
B. An Ombudsman for Invisible Taxpayers
The problem with allowing taxpayer standing based on the theory
of legal shares stems from the insignificance of any individual tax-
payer’s contribution in the context of the whole.  With each financial
interest so small, individual litigation is not a good fit.  The problems
are systemic and go to the integrity of government; it is the accumula-
tion of millions of slivers of tax injustice that make these issues impor-
tant.  Consider Hernandez:  A single taxpayer has a miniscule
economic interest in the deduction that Scientologists have under the
IRS closing agreement and current practice.  But the aggregation of
all taxpayers allows consideration of the total cost to Treasury of the
allowance, transforming tiny injuries into a significant public concern.
An unconstitutional deduction for Scientologists costs taxpayers
enough to justify judicial consideration, even with prudential limita-
tions on standing.
The challenge is to institutionalize disparate taxpayers into one
party who can sue to vindicate the rights of all.  Various forms are
possible to fulfill this function, both private and public.  Incorporated
aggregation in a public party that represents the interests of invisible
taxpayers holds real promise.148  Private parties are also possible, but
they present more difficulties.  Compared to private parties, an inde-
pendent public institution’s managerial discretion could more effec-
147 Elliott, note 59, at 487:
As Allen v. Wright demonstrates, the Court sometimes uses standing to
evade what it has elsewhere asserted as its proper role. . . . The Allen plain-
tiffs—African Americans seeking integrated schools in the South—were pre-
cisely the kind of plaintiffs who, as a discrete and insular minority, could not
seek political redress and whom Carolene Products said the Court must
protect.
148 This could be considered a “public right of action to sue to vindicate [citizens’] pri-
vate rights.”  Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 22 (2014).
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tively be limited by fiduciary obligations to taxpayers, as well as
procedural requirements.  An official public protector of invisible tax-
payers would be in a position to evaluate the myriad claims of illegal-
ity and unconstitutionality, and bring suit only where a strong legal
case can be made.
Congress could empower an official public monitor solely with re-
spect to constitutional issues, leaving the IRS its customary broad dis-
cretion over cases that do not raise constitutional questions.149  That
solution falls short of solving all the problems identified in this Arti-
cle, but a public constitutional monitor would be easy and inexpensive
to implement, and could address the most egregious injustices that
arise.  The mere existence of a constitutional monitor with the poten-
tial to intervene might be sufficient to remind the IRS about invisible
taxpayers.  Such an institutional structure could inspire the IRS to bet-
ter recognize issues that the traditional dyad treats as peripheral to its
conflict.  A separate institution representing the interest of invisible
taxpayers would operate as a filter between taxpayer complaints and
access to courts, choosing only the worthiest cases.
There is precedent for such an institutional solution in the Taxpayer
Advocate.  Under current law, the Taxpayer Advocate is sympathetic
to taxpayers who have been treated badly in the system, and is em-
powered to resolve disputes with the IRS.150  The Taxpayer Advocate
could be legally designated to act as a representative of invisible tax-
payers, with powers to intervene, sue, and otherwise protect their in-
terests.  As would be necessary for any institution charged with
protecting invisible taxpayers, the Taxpayer Advocate currently en-
joys some independence from the executive branch.  Independence is
important because protecting invisible taxpayers would require litiga-
tion against the IRS and pursuing constitutional challenges to legisla-
tion.  Under current law, the Taxpayer Advocate has no authority to
initiate suits against the government,151 and its focus of concern is in-
dividual and identifiable taxpayers, not invisible ones.  Nevertheless,
Congress could expand the Taxpayer Advocate’s role to include this
function.
As an alternative to expanding the role of the Taxpayer Advocate,
Congress could create a new institution, independent of both Con-
149 Some commentators are more broadly concerned about IRS overreach than I am.
See, e.g., Brunson, note 139; Zelenak, note 2.  Brunson and Zelenak are concerned that the
IRS is insufficiently bound by the rule of law.  But see Alice G. Abreu & Richard K.
Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 295 (2011) (explaining interpretations that
undertax as administrative necessity).
150 The powers of the Taxpayer Advocate are limited under current law.  See Brunson,
note 139, at 252.
151 See id.
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gress and the President, with authority to sue on behalf of invisible
taxpayers and which could serve as a general legal monitor for their
interests.152  The new institution would need to be independent of the
IRS, and would have fiduciary duties to taxpayers as a whole, filling in
the now empty space between the IRS and individual taxpayer liti-
gants.  A public actor not connected to any current tax institution
might offer better representation and more independence than the
Taxpayer Advocate, since the Advocate is part of the extant tax en-
forcement framework.153
Another option could be empowering private individuals to re-
present public interests.  This is an attractive option if people are
skeptical of the ability of public institutions to behave in the interest
of invisible taxpayers.  There is a long tradition of private attorneys
general bringing so-called qui tam suits to enforce various public
rights.  In that tradition, Congress creates rights that give individuals
standing to bring suit.154  The authority for qui tam actions comes
from Congress, which drafts statutory provisions giving individuals the
right to bring suit.155  Qui tam actions have withstood standing at-
tacks.  Private qui tam plaintiffs represent the legal interests granted
by Congress to the public at large.156  Individuals serve as representa-
tives of the public to enforce policy.157  Because the suit relates to an
action on the government’s behalf, the government, not the relator, is
considered the real plaintiff and if the government succeeds, the rela-
tor receives a share of the award.158
Qui tam, however, is not an easy fit for invisible taxpayers.  Qui tam
is most common where the government has been defrauded by a pri-
vate party.159  There are mechanisms in place to combat tax fraud,160
and invisible taxpayers are not victims of fraudulent individuals—they
are victims of government largesse.  Unlike in most qui tam proceed-
152 There are many complex legal issues that would arise in creating such an institution,
the precise contours of which are beyond the scope of this Article.  For a general discus-
sion, see Herz, note 83.
153 See Brunson, note 139, at 246-47.
154 See generally Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 Yale
L.J. 341 (1989).
155 See id. at 342-43.
156 See Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 418 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
157 Id.
158 Wex Legal Encyclopedia, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/qui_tam_action (last vis-
ited June 20, 2016).
159 Today, the most widely used qui tam action is to pursue violators of the federal False
Claims Act.  That statute authorizes qui tam actions against parties who have defrauded
the federal government.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. (2012).
160 See Franziska Hertel, Qui Tam for Tax?:  Lessons from the States, 113 Colum. L.
Rev. 1897 (2013) (“the IRS whistleblower program, state false claims acts implicitly au-
thorizing qui tam for tax, and the New York False Claims Act”).
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ings, the government does not perceive itself to be the harmed party—
the taxpayers shouldering more than their fair shares are individually
harmed.  Since the government granted the favored taxpayer the chal-
lenged benefit, a private party bringing a qui tam action would essen-
tially be suing on behalf of the government over tax benefits that the
government has, itself, bestowed.  Qui tam has not previously been
used in this way, although the government has been known to sue
itself.161
While private enforcement might be effective and manageable in
some areas of the law, it could prove problematic in the tax context.
Taxpayers can be uniquely hostile and unrelenting in refusing to pay
their legal share, and any invitation into the courts therefore requires
a strong gatekeeper to separate the frivolous from the serious.  Private
attorneys general in the tax context raise the specter of zealous tax
protesters overwhelming meritorious cases and swamping the system.
Consequently, private enforcement seems less desirable than public
enforcement by a specially authorized institution.  The Taxpayer Ad-
vocate or an independent counsel created for this purpose would be in
a better position to prevent a crack in the courthouse door from open-
ing too wide.
C. Mandating IRS Procedures
It might not be necessary to burden the courts with additional litiga-
tion if the IRS could do a better job following the law and upholding
the Constitution.  A less cumbersome solution to the problem of invis-
ible taxpayers than creating an institutional plaintiff could involve ad-
ministrative process. Administrative process might actually be a more
effective way to vindicate constitutional rights for invisible taxpayers,
since courts are not as interested in their role as protectors of individ-
ual rights as they once were.
The simplest administrative approach might be educating the IRS
about invisible taxpayers, and allowing it to include their interests in
its decisionmaking procedures.  Where the harm to the system from
invisibility is small, allowing the IRS discretion to consider invisible
taxpayers might be sufficient to prevent the most egregious errors.
For example, the IRS could be required to flag any revenue-reducing
agreements it enters into with specific taxpayers, and justify its deci-
sion in writing.  That procedure would allow the IRS to devote extra
attention and resources to decisionmaking when it knows that no
court will be able to adjudicate the question.
161 See Herz, note 83.
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Where the issues are legally important or the revenue loss substan-
tial, more demanding administrative consideration would be appropri-
ate.  Treasury or Congress could mandate public consideration of
invisible taxpayers in some circumstances.  To guarantee that consid-
eration, the IRS could be required to file a public acknowledgement
every time it decides to adopt a revenue-reducing position.  That ac-
knowledgement could explain the government’s decision to be gener-
ous to a particular class of taxpayers, along with a description of how
it considered the population of taxpayers as a whole.  Not every ruling
and closing agreement would need to be subject to such a procedure.
Treasury or Congress could design the rule to apply only where the
decision affects the interests of a constitutionally protected class.  Ad-
ditionally, the rule could establish a total revenue-loss threshold in
cases lacking individual rights claims.
Somewhat more process might be appropriate for the most signifi-
cant decisions.  In those cases, the IRS could be required to follow
notice and comment processes, similar to the procedures used for
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act or where the
APA does not apply.162  For example, the IRS could have been re-
quired to solicit comments on its decision to allow the charitable de-
duction for Scientologists.  There could have been a multi-stage
process imposing hurdles before the decision could go into effect.  The
process itself might have made the IRS more reflective about the sub-
stance of the closing agreement.  The transparency produced by such a
process might also be a monitoring force.163  Nobody knows how
many unconstitutional private agreements the IRS has concluded with
individual taxpayers because they are not public.  A comment process
would have given other taxpayers the opportunity to argue that the
Scientology closing agreement was an unconstitutional reversal of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Hernandez.  People with an interest in
challenging the unconstitutional administration of the tax law—like a
tax law professor—would be likely to participate in that context.
When taxpayers believe that proposed Treasury regulations are un-
constitutional, they are not shy about commenting.164  Where there is
162 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
163 The Scientology closing agreement was leaked, presumably by someone who worked
at the IRS, to the Wall Street Journal, so it was not actually secret.  See Scientologists and
the IRS, note 36.  Nevertheless, the drafters of the agreement expected that it would not be
disclosed.
164 Sometimes by the tens of thousands, as in the case of regulations proposed to govern
the political activities of § 501(c)(4) organizations.  See IRS Update on the Proposed New
Regulation on 501(c)(4) Organizations, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Update-on-
the-Proposed-New-Regulation-on-501(c)(4)-Organizations (last visited June 20, 2016)
(over 150,000 written comments received).
2016] INVISIBLE TAXPAYERS 671
a substantial outcry, the Treasury Department has no choice but to
examine its policies more closely.165
Procedures that require the Treasury to more closely examine the
constitutionality of its administration are a good idea.  Nevertheless,
internal Treasury procedures cannot wholly substitute for judicial re-
view in constitutional cases since courts are the final arbiters of consti-
tutionality.  Better administrative procedure could be linked to
limited expansion of judicial review.  As the three featured cases
make clear, there are constitutional issues that arise in tax cases that
are so important that the Supreme Court needs to resolve them.  Re-
call that the Obama administration bent over backwards in Windsor
to make sure that the courts would retain jurisdiction.  In Bob Jones,
the Supreme Court itself appointed an amicus to argue the govern-
ment’s position, rather than lose the opportunity to decide the case.166
Administrative process might be sufficient for cases in which the
IRS gives a taxpayer particularly generous treatment, but where the
issues do not raise constitutional questions.  One example in this cate-
gory is the recent IRS decision to interpret § 382 in a way that allowed
some troubled banks to use net operating losses to reduce their tax
liabilities.167  Many people believed that the IRS lacked the authority
to issue that guidance, given the language in the statute.168  If that is
true, then applying the guidance to taxpayers would be illegal. Never-
theless, other taxpayers who are stuck with the consequences of
§ 382’s limitations are not in a position to attack the government’s
decision to help the big banks.  Like the Sklars, they can complain
about their bad treatment, but not about another taxpayer’s better
treatment.
The difference between the § 382 losers and the Sklars is that the
Sklars have a constitutional claim, while the § 382 losers have a claim
about the interpretation of a statute.  While it is not desirable for the
IRS to play favorites among taxpayers, statutory and constitutional
favoritism could be treated differently.  Judicial intervention might
only be necessary where constitutional violations of individual rights
are alleged.  The line between permissible exercise of discretion and
IRS overreach is not always clear.  A wholly internal process, in which
165 The 501(c)(4) regulation was proposed in November 2013.  78 Fed. Reg. 71535 (Nov.
29, 2013).  Congress has since prohibited the IRS from adopting regulations to define poli-
ticking organizations.  See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113,
div. E, tit. I, § 127, 129 Stat. 2242, 2433 (2015).
166 See Johnson, note 19.
167 Notice 2008-83, 2008-2 C.B. 905; Notice 2010-2, 2010-2 C.B. 251.
168 See, e.g., Cushman, note 66; J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmussen, Can Treasury
Exempt Its Own Companies from Tax?  The $45 Billion GM NOL Carryforward, 1 Cato
Papers on Pub. Pol’y 1 (2011); Zelenak, note 2, at 846-47.
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the IRS deliberates on its own decisions, without oversight by a court,
might be sufficient to address the most egregious cases of statutory
favoritism.  Simply identifying the biases created by invisible taxpay-
ers might be sufficient to reduce their effects.
D. Judicial Recognition of Invisible Taxpayers
Courts themselves can also take initiative in making taxpayers more
visible by considering the implications of their decisions for invisible
taxpayers.  No change in standing doctrine would be necessary.
Rather, courts would need to recognize the invisibility of most taxpay-
ers, and the injustice of continuing to place them outside the legal
regime.  They would need to acknowledge the far reach that their cur-
rent rulings have on all the taxpayers who will never have standing to
complain.  The scope of judicial decisions already affects invisible tax-
payers, but nobody currently considers their interests.
The Sklar court could have ruled more broadly than it did.  It noted
the unconstitutionality of the IRS’ treatment of the Church of
Scientology, but it left the status quo alone.  The court had a party
with standing before it since the Sklars were arguing about their own
tax liability.  It also had the IRS in court, as happens in every tax
dispute.  The IRS knew that the Sklars were trying to get the benefit
of the Scientology ruling, and the government had ample opportunity
to defend its policy before the court.  If the Ninth Circuit had declared
the IRS’ Scientology policy in violation of the Establishment Clause,
the Sklars would still have lost, but justice overall would have been
better served.
People should have an incentive to raise constitutional issues that
courts cannot otherwise decide, as long as those issues are related to
the question of their own tax liability.  While the precedent on relig-
ious schools was well settled by the time the Sklars brought their case,
they had a colorable claim that they should be entitled to the tax ben-
efits enjoyed by Scientologists.  Allowing collateral attack on IRS pol-
icy by taxpayers who might benefit from it allows courts to identify the
interrelationships among taxpayers, and to protect the interests of tax-
payers who are not before the court.  Taxpayers arguing about their
own liabilities can assist the IRS and the courts in recognizing the ef-
fect of tax policies on individuals who are outside the traditional dyad.
In addition, courts should have an interest in protecting judicial
precedents.  The IRS policy on Scientologists is in clear conflict with
the Supreme Court’s holding in Hernandez.  Once there is a clear con-
stitutional determination that applies to the very circumstance, it is a
matter of the courts reinforcing their own decisions.  This is another
distinction between Sklar and the IRS notice on net operating losses.
2016] INVISIBLE TAXPAYERS 673
Where the IRS flouts a statute, the interbranch conflict involves the
IRS and Congress.  Congress is more likely to be interested in cor-
recting an IRS mistake about the application of legislation (like § 382)
that it is in correcting an erroneous application of case law (like Her-
nandez).  Furthermore, it is not hard to imagine a situation in which
Congress adopts a statute, the IRS enforces it, and then a court de-
clares the statute unconstitutional.  The IRS and Congress are on the
same page throughout, but the courts are not.
A recently reversed decision on the parsonage exemption is a good
example, and the lower court’s decision might be a good model, if the
Supreme Court allows the lower courts to take initiative.  There is a
tax exemption for housing provided to clergy that is not generally
available to others who receive housing from their employers.169  The
so-called parsonage exemption has been part of the Code for decades,
but a court first held it unconstitutional in 2013.170  Some maintain
that the exemption is constitutionally acceptable,171 while others
disagree.172
The district court in Freedom from Religion v. Lew allowed the
atheist plaintiffs to proceed “because it is clear from the face of the
statute that plaintiffs are excluded from an exemption granted to
others.”173  While the atheists can surely complain that they are being
taxed too much, that is a distinct claim from arguing that others are
being taxed too little.  While the district court could (and did) reach
the constitutional question in the parsonage case, it alternatively could
have disposed of the plaintiffs’ claims without doing so, as the Sklar
court did, and as the Seventh Circuit said it should have done.174  By
reaching the constitutional question, the district court protected the
interests of many taxpayers not before the court, and placed the liti-
169 See IRC § 107.
170 Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 983 F.Supp.2d 1051, 1053 (W.D. Wis.
2013) (concluding that “§ 107(2) violates the establishment clause under the holding in
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 890, 103 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), because the
exemption provides a benefit to religious persons and no one else, even though doing so is
not necessary to alleviate a special burden on religious exercise.”)  The Seventh Circuit
vacated in November 2014.  Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 773 F.3d 815 (7th
Cir. 2014).  An earlier challenge survived a motion to dismiss.  Freedom from Religion
Found., Inc. v. Geithner, 715 F.Supp.2d 1051 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
171 See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Religious Tax Exemptions Entangle in Violation
of the Establishment Clause?  The Constitutionality of the Parsonage Allowance Exclusion
and the Religious Exemptions of the Individual Health Care Mandate and the FICA and
Self-Employment Taxes, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1633 (2012) (concluding that the exemption is
constitutionally permitted, but not required).
172 See, e.g., Phil Bednar, After Warren:  Revisiting Taxpayer Standing and the Constitu-
tionality of Parsonage Allowances, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 2016 (2003).
173 Freedom From Religion Found., 983 F.Supp.2d at 1053.
174 Freedom From Religion Found., 773 F.3d at 825.
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gant before it in a larger context, where tax fairness requires demands
that fair shares are in relation to one another.
Every branch of government has an obligation to see that the tax
system is legal, so courts should not ignore the constitutional ques-
tions that stare them in the face when presented with ordinary tax
cases.  Courts often decide issues that affect taxpayers other than the
one before the court—any determination about the interpretation of a
statute necessarily implicates other taxpayers.  Taxpayers challenging
their own liabilities on one side and the IRS defending its position to
collect that revenue on the other, present a clear controversy, and
courts would be in comfortable territory adjudicating matters between
adversaries.  Given the policies at stake, and the real danger that un-
constitutional administration will continue indefinitely, courts should
be more open to deciding constitutional questions that are raised by
taxpayers with standing, even if it is not mandatory that they decide
those questions to narrowly resolve the case before it.
VI. CONCLUSION
The invisibility of taxpayers in the legal system creates a substantial
problem for tax justice, both substantive and procedural.  The courts’
application of standing doctrine, as well as its conceptualization of tax
expenditures as not involving state action, has narrowed the opportu-
nity for judicial review for tax-reducing actions taken by both Con-
gress and the IRS.  These developments fail to protect individuals,
even when they have substantial individual rights claims under the
Constitution.  There is always a cost to someone in taxation, and costs
borne by invisible people are much easier for everyone else to accept.
By restricting judicial recognition to the traditional dyad, the structure
of tax litigation ignores how burdens are shifted outside it.  Tax policy
is inconsistent—its legal analysis ignores these invisible taxpayers,
while its economic analysis concedes they are indispensable.
Because this Article presented a theory of tax injury and tax fair-
ness (and not a theory of standing), there are many potential plaintiffs
and claims that are beyond the scope of its analysis.  Nontaxpayers are
invisible in the tax system, even though their interests are implicated
in it, but the theory offered here is not directly relevant to them.175  If
nontaxpayer interests are considerably different from the interests of
taxpayers outside the traditional dyad who would have standing under
175 On account of the payroll tax, most households are taxpayers, even though a sub-
stantial number do not pay net income taxes.  It is estimated that 43% of households do
not pay income tax, but only 14% do not pay payroll taxes, primarily the elderly.  See
Urban-Brookings Tax Pol’y Ctr., Who Doesn’t Pay Federal Taxes?, http://www.taxpolicy
center.org/taxtopics/federal-taxes-households.cfm (last visited Aug. 26, 2016).
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this theory, then more work will be necessary to render them visible as
well.  Nevertheless, the analysis developed here is likely to remedy the
problem of constitutional tax cases where no one has standing, so it
may well be sufficient.  Similarly, while the theory is primarily de-
signed to recognize when a taxpayer has an injury from paying taxes,
it may inform analysis of government spending as well.
This Article examined the contours of tax justice along economic
and legal dimensions by focusing on invisible taxpayers, who have a
great stake in the fairness of the tax system but no legal rights to chal-
lenge injustice.  It argued that the application of standing doctrine to
taxpayer challenges has been more stringent than the constitutional
rules require, and that mechanisms to allow invisible taxpayers a day
in court could better strengthen the rule of law.  Invisible taxpayers
have gone mostly unnoticed in the literature because tax policy de-
bates about fairness focus primarily on issues of economic fairness,
while ignoring issues of democratic fairness.  Given the broad reach of
the tax system, it is crucial that taxation satisfy the most demanding
standards for fairness.  Social institutions that allow taxpayers to re-
main invisible cannot be just.  Congress, the IRS, and the courts all
have roles to play in making the legal system see those who suffer
burdens, but are now invisible.
